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Has Wright Line Gone Wrong?
Why Pretext Can Be Sufficient to
Prove Discrimination Under the
National Labor Relations Act
Michael J. Hayes·
ABSTRACT

Every year in the United States, thousands of employees are illegally fired
for joining or supporting unions. These employees must bring their claims to the
NatioI1;al Labor Relations Board (the "Board"), which applies its famous Wright
Line standard to decide thousands of discrimination cases each year.
Probably the most common issue in labor discrimination cases is "pretext."
In virtually every case, an employer claims that it fired an employee not for an
illegal antiunion motive, but for a legitimate business reason. The pretext issue
arises when the evidence shows that the legitimate reason asserted by the
employer was most likely not the true reason for firing the employee. The role

such evidence of pretext can play in proving antiunion discrimination has been
controversial. The Board's position on that issue has fluctuated over the years,
and the federal circuit courts that review the Board's decisions have often
disagreed with the Board.
This Article explains how the Board has resolved the pretext issue and
analyzes whether the Board's resolution is correct. Based on comprehensive
research of hundreds of Board and court decisions, the Article provides the first
complete discussion of the role of evidence of pretext in discrimination cases.
The Article identifies two fundamental questions at the heart of the
controversy over evidence of pretext, and proposes solutions to both. The first
question is whether evidence regarding the employer's reason for its action,
particularly when presented by the employer, can be considered when deciding
if the employee has proven discrimination. The Article explains that basic
evidentiary principles from ordinary civil law, largely ignored in labor
discrimination cases, make clear that the answer is yes. The second question is
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whether evidence of pretext can be the primary basis for finding discriminatory
motivation. Here, the Article criticizes the Board and the courts for treating all
. types of evidence of pretext as equal, and explains which types of evidence of
pretext provide a reasonable basis for finding discrimination.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A core feature of the National Labor Relations Act (''NLRA''), and hence
of American labor relations policy, is the protection of employees who join or
support unions from retaliation by employers: The NLRA's sponsors

1. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994), prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees to encourage or discourage union membership or
support.
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recognized that this safeguard against discrimination was necessary because,
without it, employees' statutory right to choose union representation would be
oflittle practical worth. 2

Subsequent experience has proven that the ban on discrimination is indeed
of central importance. Year after year, claims of employer discrimination
account for a majority of all unfair labor practice charges filed against

employers.3 Discriminatory discharges and other reprisals against union
supporters have become a widespread tactic of employers in resisting
unionization.
In a recent study, Cornell University Professor Kate
Bronfenbrenner found that thirty-two percent of employers involved with
organizing campaigns fired union activists during the course of the campaign
and that, on average, these employers fired at least four union supporters.4

Unions are also prohibited from discriminating, or causing an employer to
discriminate, against an employee. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1994). This Article
focuses on employer discrimination cases because relatively few union discrimination
cases are brought under the NLRA.
2. See S. REp. No. 573, at 11 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Aer, at 2300, 2311 (1949) (stating, with regard to
the anti-discrimination provision of the NLRA, that "if the right to be free from employer
interference in self organization or to join or refrain from joining a labor organization is
to have any practical meaning, it must be accompanied by assurance that its exercise will
not result in discriminatory treatment or loss of opportunity for work"); 79 CONGo REc.
7570 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert Wagner, chiefsponsor of the NLRA), reprinted
in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVEHISTORYOFTHENATIONALLABORRELATIONSAer, at 2321,
2335 (1949) ("This [anti-discrimination provision] is merely a logical and imperative
extension of that section of the Noms-LaGuardia Act which makes the 'yellow dog'
contract unenforceable in the Federal courts. If freedom of organization is to be
preserved the employees must have more than the knowledge that the courts will not be
used to confirm injustice. They need protection most in those very cases where the
employer is strong enough to impress his will without the aid oflaw.").
3. See 63 NLRB ANN. REp. 6 (1999) (stating that in fiscal year 1998, "[t]he
majority of all charges against employers alleged illegal discharge or other discrimination
against employees. There were 11,763 such charges in 55 percent of the total charges
that employers committed violations."); 62 NLRB ANN. REP. 6 (1998) (in fiscal year

1997, "[t]he majority of all charges against employers alleged illegal discharge or other
discrimination against employees. There were 13,127 such charges in 56 percent of the
total charges that employers committed violations."); 61 NLRB ANN. REp. 6 (1997) (in
fiscal year 1996, "[t]he majority of all charges against employers alleged illegal discharge
or other discrimination against employees. There were 13,305 such charges in 56 percent
of the total charges that employers committed violations."); 60 NLRB ANN. REp. 6
(1996) (stating that in fiscal year 1995, "[t]he majority of all charges against employers
alleged illegal discharge or other discrimination against employees. There were 13,298
such charges in 55 percent of the total charges that employers committed violations.").
4. See KATE BRONFENBRENNER, LABOR SECRETARIAT, NORTH AMERICAN COMM'N
FOR LABOR COOPERATION, FINAL REpORT, THE EFFEerS OF PLANT CLOSING OR THREAT
OF PLANT CLOSING ON THE RIGHT OF WORKERS TO ORGANIZE, at tb1.I 1 (1996), available
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Consequently, discriminatory discharge is a serious threat to all employees who
seek to exercise their right to support a union. In fact, based on the number of
employees to whom the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") has
awarded reinstatement or other remedies for discriminatory termination, Harvard
University Professor Paul Weiler has estimated that as many as five to ten
percent of all employees who support unions in representation elections are

discriminatorily discharged.S
In most employer discrimination cases, the employer has taken an adverse
action (e.g., discharge, discipline, refusal to hire) against an employee who was
undisputedly a union member or supporter. Consequently, employer
discrimination cases usually turn on the employer's motivation for taking the
adverse action. 6 Moreover, because employers invariably deny having an illegal

at www.ilr.comeII.eduJIibrary/e_archive/govJeports.
5. In a 1983 law review article, Professor Weiler explained that in 1980,200,000
employees voted for unions in representation campaigns, and 15,000 employees received
reinstatement or other remedies for discriminatory treatment, usually termination.
Because a high percentage of discriminatory discharges occur during representation
election campaigns, and at least some employees have been discriminatorily discharged
without prevailing in a Section 8(a)(3) case, Professor Weiler estimated that ''the .•. odds
are about one in twenty that a union supporter" in a representation election campaign
would be fired. See Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to
Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769, 1781 (1983). In his 1990
book, Governing the Workplace, Professor Weiler observed that in 1985, though the
number of employees who voted for a union had decreased to 100,000, the number of
employees who secured reinstatement for dismissals in violation of Section 8(a)(3) was
still somewhat higher than 10,000. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE
238-39 (1990).
6. The central importance of the employer's motivation in Section 8(a)(3) cases
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17, 44 (1954), in which the Court declared, "[t]hat Congress intended the
employer's purpose in discriminating to be controlling is clear."
In unusual cases involving employer conduct that has been deemed "inherently
destructive" of employee rights under the National Labor Relations Act, an affirmative
showing that the employer had an unlawful motive is not required. The Supreme Court
has explained that in cases of "inherently destructive" conduct, the conduct itself is
sufficient to prove unlawful intent. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34
(1967). But as a leading treatise on labor law has observed, "[t]he great majority of
section 8(a)(3) cases do not involve conduct 'inherently destructive of employee rights. '"
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 192 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Hardin]. In
almost all Section 8(a)(3) cases, including discharges and discipline of union activists,
refusals to hire employees considered likely to support unions, and discrimination in
employment terms to penali?e union supporters, unlawful motivation must be proven in
order for a violation to be found. Thus, in most Section 8(a)(3) cases, "the employer's
motive is determinative." See id.
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motive, the critical issue is what evidence of illegal, antiunion motive is
sufficient to prove employer discrimination.
Since 1980, the Board and the courts have applied the "Wright Line
standard" to detennine whether the employer had an illegal motive for taking an
adverse action against an employee. Under the Wright Line standard,1 the Board
first decides whether the General Counsel of the Boards has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employee's union support or other
protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to take the
challenged action against the employee. If not, the employer wins. If so, the
Board decides whether the employer has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action regardless of the
employee's protected conduct.9 This two-step decisional process is followed by
the Board, or its administrative law judges ("ALJs"), in hundreds of cases each
year, and by the federal courts of appeals in dozens of appeals of Board
decisions every year. IO
Probably the most common issue in employer discrimination cases is the
role of evidence of "pretext." In virtually every case employing the Wright Line
standard, the employer claims it took the challenged action against the employee
not for an unlawful motive, but for some legitimate reason. The pretext issue
arises when the record in the case shows, in some way, that the legitimate reason
asserted by the employer was most likely not the "true" reason for its challenged
action.
Pretext can be shown in at least three different ways:
(1) The record makes clear that the facts underlying the employer's
proffered reason(s) for its challenged action did not exist,
(2) There is no support in the record that the facts underlying the
employer's proffered reason(s) did exist, or
(3) The record shows that the facts underlying the proffered reason(s) did
exist, but the record shows that these facts were probably not the real
reason for the challenged action. II

7. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (I 980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1 st Cir.
1981).
8. The General Counsel is the name given to the prosecutorial arm of the Board.
"The General Counsel has authority to investigate charges of unfair labor practices, to
decide whether complaints should be issued on the basis of these charges and to direct
prosecution of such complaints." ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 102 (12th ed. 1996).
9. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.RB. at 1089.
10. The number of Board and court cases involving application of the Wright Line
standard can be readily ascertained by "Shepardizing" the original Wright Line decision.
11. These three types of pretext are based on a discussion by then law firm partner,
now Professor Kathleen M. Kelly, of categories of pretext cases in Kathleen M. Kelly,
Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc., The Right Answer to the Wrong Question:
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The Board and the courts have hardly ever aclmowledged the distinctions
between these means of showing pretext, and instead usually apply the unitary
labels of "pretext" or "evidence of pretext" to anything in the record that
suggests that the reasons the employer has offered for taking the challenged
action are not the true reasons for that action. Consequently, when this Article
discusses Board and court precedents, it also uses generic terms such as
"pretext" and "evidence of pretext." Part V of the Article explains that the
Board and the courts have erred in failing to distinguish between different types
of evidence of pretext.
.
Although the Board tends to treat all types of evidence of pretext the same,
the Board has fluctuated in its approach to evidence of pretext in the twenty
years since Wright Line was decided. 12 In the past, the Board often took the
position that evidence of pretext could not be considered in the first stage of the
Wright Line process in deciding whether the employer had an antiunion
motivation, but was relevant only in assessing the merits of the employer's
defense in the second stage. 13 Currently, the Board's view is that evidence of
pretext can be considered in the first stage, and can even be the primary basis for
fmding unlawful motivation by the employer.14 The Board's current position is
controversial, and has been questioned by some courts of appeals. IS
The uncertainty, and disagreements, regarding the handling of evidence of
pretext have resulted from varying answers to two fundamental questions:
(1) Can evidence of pretext be considered in the first step of the Wright Line
process, when the Board is deciding if the General Counsel has proven illegal
motivation?, and (2) Is evidence of pretext sufficient by itself to prove illegal
motivation?
This Article examines these questions in two ways. First, it describes how
the Board and the federal courts of appeals have answered these questions. In
so doing, the Article provides a description of the law that fills a void in the
existing literature. In the early 1980s, there was a spate of articles on the
Board's adoption of the Wright Line standard,16 but since that time there has
been little attention paid to the application of Wright Line. There have been
many significant developments regarding the Wright Line standard in the past
decade, particularly with respect to evidence of pretext. This Article provides

A Review ofits Impact to Date, 14 PAC. L.J. 869, 882-84 (1983).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 95-98.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 102-30.
15. See infra Part IV.A.

16. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 11, at 869; Peter Kilgore, The Proper Test for
Determining Violations in Mixed Motive Cases, 34 LAB. L.1. 279 (1983); Madelyn C.
Squire, Good Intentions Gone Wrong: 8(a)(3) Supreme Court and Circuit Court
Roundup, with a Look at Wright Line, 26 How. L.J. 9 (1983); Mary Teresa Sobnosky,
Note, Wright Line and Wrongfol Discharge Actions: A Uniform Standard ofReview, 33
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 404 (1983).
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a much needed explanation of the development of the law on the treatment of
evidence of pretext in discrimination cases.
Then, Part V of the Article reconnnends how the Board should answer the
two fundamental questions underlying the controversy over evidence of pretext.
The first question, whether the Board can consider evidence of pretext in the first
stage of the Wright Line process, can be more specifically restated as: Can the
Board, when considering if the General Counsel has proven its "prima facie"
case, consider evidence of pretext that entered the record during presentation of
the employer's case? Part V explains that this question can be readily resolved
by looking at basic principles of evidence and procedure from ordinary civil
litigation. In short, the basic rule in civil law is that a trier of fact can consider
any evidence in the record, regardless of who produced that evidence. Part V
will explain that this rule should apply when the Board is deciding the factual
issue of the employer's motivation for the challenged action.
Given that it is appropriate for the Board to consider evidence of pretext
in the first stage of the Wright Line process, Part V then discusses the second of
the two questions: Is evidence of pretext sufficient in itself for the Board to fmd
unlawful motivation? The key to resolving this question is the connnon-sense
proposition, recognized in some Board and appeals court precedents,17 and
recently reaffirmed by the United States Supreme COurt,18 that when a party
offers a false reason for its action, it is likely that the party is seeking to conceal
an improper or unlawful motive. Accordingly, this Article contends that when
evidence of pretext demonstrates or strongly indicates that the employer has
engaged in deception and concealment of its true motive for an action, that is a
reasonable basis for the Board to infer that the true motive is unlawful.
However, not all types of evidence of pretext are equal in tenus of
indicating deception and concealment. Part V explains that there are multiple
types of evidence of pretext with differing probative values. The type of
evidence of pretext with the strongest probative value is clear proof that the
employer deliberately fabricated the reasons for its action, and the weakest
evidence of pretext is discrediting the testimony of the employer's witnesses on
the basis of demeanor. The major differences between the probative values of
different types of evidence of pretext are completely lost in the Board's and the
courts' current approach of treating "evidence of pretext" as a unitary whole.
Consequently, the Article concludes by reconnnending that the Board and the
courts expressly acknowledge the differing probative values of the different
types of evidence of pretext, and that they explain more clearly why the

17. See infra text accompanying notes 131-42, 340-45, 363-70 and text between
notes 398-99 (discussing Ninth Circuit's seminal decision in Shattuck Denn Mining Co.
v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966), and its progeny).
18. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108-09
(2000); see also infra Part IV.B.2. (discussing Reeves).
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"stronger" types of evidence of pretext provide a reasonable basis for fmding
that the employer had an unlawful antiunion motivation.

n.

THE WRIGHT LINE STANDARD

A. The Wright Line Decision
For an employer to be held liable for discrimination under Section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA, the Board must find that the employer was motivated by antiunion
animus in making the decision at issue. Section 10(c) of the NLRA requires that

the Board must find all unfair labor practices, including Section 8(a)(3)
violations, by a "preponderance of the testimony.,,19 Therefore, an employer's
action against an employee cannot be deemed to breach Section 8(a)(3) unless
the Board finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the action was
motivated by antiunion animus. 20
The NLRA, however, does not define the extent to which an employer's
action must be motivated by antiunion animus in order to be deemed unlawful
under Section 8(a)(3). Does animus have to be the sole cause of the action, the
primary cause of the action, or is it sufficient that antiunion animus be a
contributing cause of the action? For many years, the federal courts of appeals
disagreed among themselves, and with the Board, on the "quantum of animus"
that was sufficient to find a violation of Section 8(a)(3).21 In 1980, the Board
undertook to resolve this dispute and to establish a standard for assessing Section
8(a)(3) violations in Wright Line.22 The Board announced in Wright Line that it
was adopting a new test for deciding Section 8(a)(3) cases, and that its test
would be based largely on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mt.
Healthy City School District Board ofEducation v. Doyle. 23
In Mt. Healthy, a public school district had refused to renew a teacher's
contract, and the district had both legitimate motives (such as the teacher's
making an obscene gesture to female students), and an illegitimate motive
(penalizing the teacher for exercising his First Amendment rights) for its

19. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994).
20. In cases of discharge or discipline of employees, this principle is reinforced by
another provision of Section lO(c), which states, ''No order of the Board shall require the
reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged,
or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged
for cause." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, if the discipline or
discharge was motivated by a "cause" other than antiunion animus, the employer could
not be held liable for that adverse employment action.
21. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 193 & nn.47-52; Kelly, supra note 11, at 873-77
(discussing the division over this issue prior to the Board's decision in Wright Line).
22. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981).
23. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).

2000]

HAS WRIGHT LINE GONE WRONG?

891

decision.24 The lower courts had ruled that the school district had violated the
First Amendment because its illegitimate motive played a "substantial part" in
its decision.2s The Supreme Court disagreed. In place of the lower courts'
standard, the Court established a two-stage test to be applied in "dual
motivation" cases, like Mt. Healthy, where both legitimate and illegitimate
reasons motivated the employer's action. The Court held that in the first stage,
the burden was on the employee to show that his protected conduct "was a
'substantial factor' or a 'motivating factor' in the [employer's] decision not to
rehire him.,,26 If the employee satisfied that burden, the Court held, the court
should have "gone on to determine whether the [employer] had shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as
to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct. ,,27
In Wright Line, the Board offered three reasons why the two-stage Mt.
Healthy standard should also apply in Section 8(a)(3) cases. First, the Board
found that the legislative history of the NLRA and Supreme Court precedent
supported the notion that a two-stage, burden-shifting process was appropriate
in Section 8(a)(3) cases.28 Second, the Board found that this approach was also
consistent with its own precedents.29 Finally, and most important, the Board
declared that the two-stage process "accommodates the legitimate competing
interests" of employers and employees in Section 8(a)(3) cases, and furthered
"the policies and objectives of Section 8(a) (3) of the ACt.,,30
The Board defined its new standard as follows:
First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a prima facie
showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was
a 'motivating factor' in the employer's decision. Once this is
established, the burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that
the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the
protected conduct.3 )
This definition still accurately describes the major features of the "Wright Line
standard" used to decide Section 8(a)(3) cases.

24. ld. at 281-82. The specific First Amendment activity that was penalized was
the teacher's disclosure to a local radio station of the school's new dress and appearance
policy for teachers. ld. at 282-83.
25. ld. at 283-85.
26. ld. at 287.

27.ld.
28. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir.1981).

29.ld.
30. ld. at 1088-89.
31. ld. at 1089.
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Although the Mt. Healthy test on which the Wright Line standard was based
was developed for "dual motive" cases, the Board indicated in Wright Line that
the standard would apply to both pretext and dual motive cases. Near the
beginning of its analysis in Wright Line, the Board explained the distinction
between pretext and dual motive cases. The Board began by discussing the
similarities between pretext and dual motive cases, observing that in virtually all
Section 8(a)(3) cases, the employer does not admit that it took action against an
employee because of union activities.32 "Instead," the Board pointed out, the
employer "will generally advance what it asserts to be a legitimate business
reason for its action.,,33 Thus, both pretext and dual motive cases share the
common feature that the employer asserts it had a legitimate reason for taking
the adverse action against the employee.
The difference between pretext and dual motive cases, the Board explained
in Wright Line, was what the evidence revealed about the legitimate reason the
employer proffered for its action. The Board effectively defmed a pretext case
as one in which "examination of the evidence ... reveal[s] ... that the asserted
justification is a sham in that the purported rule or circumstance advanced by the
employer did not exist, or was not, in fact, relied upon. ,,34 Such cases should be
termed pretext cases, the Board reasoned, because "no legitimate business
justification for the discipline exists, there is, by strict definition, no dual
motive.,,3s On the other hand, in dual motive cases, the evidence reveals the
"existence of both a 'good' and 'bad' reason for the employer's action.,,36
After explaining the difference between pretext and dual motive cases, the
Board noted, "Unfortunately, the distinction between a pretext case and a dual
motive case is sometimes difficult to discern. This is especially true since the
appropriate designation seldom can be made until after the presentation of all
relevant evidence.,,37 In other words, a Section 8(a)(3) case cannot be
categorized as a pretext or a dual motive case until there is enough evidence in
the record, to judge the authenticity of the employer's proffered reason. The fact
that categorization of a case is contingent on the state of the record creates what
the Board in Wright Line called "conceptual problems," and makes it difficult for
ALJs and the Board to adjudicate Section 8(a) (3) cases when the standards for
pretext and dual motive cases are different. 38
Therefore, as the Board noted repeatedly in Wright Line, one advantage of
the Wright Line standard is that "there is no real need to distinguish between

32. Id. at 1083.
33. Id. at 1083-84.
34. Id. at 1084.
35.Id.
36.Id.
37. !d. at 1084 n.5.
38. [d.
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pretext and dual motive cases. ,,39 After discussing the difficulties in drawing that
distinction, the Board asserted, "The conceptual problems to which this
sometimes blurred distinction gives rise can be eliminated if one views the
employer's asserted justification as an affirmative defense,,,40 which, the Board
implied, is what the Wright Line standard does. The Board explained that
treating the employer's justification as an affirmative defense would clarify the
issues in the litigation of Section 8(a)C3) cases: "Thus, in a pretext situation, the
employer's affirmative defense of business justification is wholly without merit.
If, however, the affirmative defense has at least some merit a 'dual motive' may
exist and the issue becomes one of the sufficiency of proof necessary for the
employer's affirmative defense to be sustained.,,41
As some of the passages quoted above demonstrate, the Board in Wright
Line consistently referred to the second stage of the new standard as an
"affirmative defense" for the employer. The use of this term was closely related
to the Board's position that the Wright Line standard complied with the
requirement in Section 1OCc) of the NLRA that the General Counsel bear the
burden of proving the commission of an unfair labor practice. The Board
explained:
Ii should be noted that this shifting of burdens does not undermine the
established concept that the General Counsel must establish an unfair
labor practice by a preponderance of the evidence. The shifting
burden merely requires the employer to make out what is actually an

affinnative defense ... to overcome the prima facie case of wrongful
motive. Such a requirement does not shift the ultimate burden.42
This reasoning meant that the General Counsel's evidence supporting its "prima
facie case of wrongful motive" had to be sufficient to sustain a fmding that the
employer violated Section 8(a)(3).
In Wright Line, the Board provided some indications of what it would
require of the General Counsel at the first stage of the Wright Line process. At
one point, the Board described the first stage of the process as "an inquiry as to
whether protected activities played a role in the employer's decision."43 The
Board then explained that the second stage involved a determination of whether
the employer's evidence regarding its asserted reason for its action "negate[d]
the General Counsel's showing of prohibited motivation.,,44 The Board then
added in footnote twelve that "[t]he absence of any legitimate basis for an action,

39. [d. at 1083 n.4.

40. !d. at 1084 n.S.
41.
42.
43.
44.

[d.
[d. at 1088 n.11.
[d. at 1088 (emphasis added).
[d.
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of course, may fonn part of the proof of the General Counsel's case.,,4S As will
be discussed below, this statement by the Board in footnote twelve of Wright
Line has played an important role in many of the Board's decisions in pretext
cases.
In explaining how the Wright Line standard appropriately balanced the
interests of employees and employers, the Board described what was required
to meet the General Counsel's burden at the first stage of the standard: "[T]he
aggrieved employee is afforded protection since he or she is only required
initially to show that protected activities played a role in the employer's
decision.'046 In the second stage, the Board explained, the employer is given the
opportunity to "establish its asserted legitimate justification," and "if the
employer cannot make the necessary showing" at the second stage, "it should not
be heard to object to the employee's being made whole because its action will
have been found to have been motivated by an unlawful consideration in a
manner consistent with congressional intent, Supreme Court precedent, and
established Board processes.,,47 Thus, the Board suggested that a showing by the
General Counsel that antiunion animus had "played a role" in an employer's
adverse decision against an employee was sufficient to shift the burden to the
employer to prove that even without the union animus, it would have made the
same decision for a legitimate reason, and to establish a Section 8(a)(3) violation
if the employer failed to meet that burden.
In the fmal section of its Wright Line opinion, the Board applied its new
standard to the facts of the case. Of particular relevance to this Article, the
Board placed considerable reliance on evidence of pretext in fmding that the
employer violated Section 8(a) (3). In Wright Line, the employer asserted that
it had discharged the discriminatee "for violating a plant rule against 'lmowingly
altering, or falsifying production time reports, payroll records, time cards. ",48
During its discussion of the prima facie case, the Board expressly stated that one
of its bases for concluding that the General Counsel had proven its prima facie
case was that the reason the employer proffered for the discharge was false.
Specifically, the Board relied on the facts that other employees commonly
completed time sheets in the same manner without being disciplined, that two
employees who had deliberately falsified time cards were disciplined through
warnings rather than termination, and that the employer had departed from its
usual practic~ when it fired the discriminatee without first issuing a warning. 49

45. ld. at 1088 n.l2 (citing ShattuckDenn Mining Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d466 (9th
CiT. 1966».
46. ld. at 1089 (emphasis added).
47.ld.
48.ld.
49. ld. at 1O~0-91.
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B. The Transportation Management Decision
In the first few years following the Board's decision in Wright Line, most
of the federal courts of appeals upheld the Board's new two-stage standard.50
However, by 1982, at least three federal circuit courts had criticized the Wright
Line standard's shifting of the burden of persuasion to the employer at the
second stage. These courts contended that such burden-shifting was inconsistent
with Section 10(c) of the NLRA, which they read as requiring the General
Counsel to prove that the unlawful motive was the predominant, or "but for"
cause, of the challenged action against the employee.51 This division between
the federal courts of appeals led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in NLRB
v. Transportation Management Corp.,52 to resolve whether the Wright Line
standard was valid under the NLRA.53
The Supreme Court in Transportation Management defined the question
before it as "whether the burden placed on the employer in Wright Line is
consistent with §§ 8(a)(I) and 8(a)(3), as well as with § 10(c) of the NLRA,
which provides that the Board must find an unfair labor practice by a
'preponderance of the evidence. ",54 The Court, reversing the First Circuit,
unanimously concluded that the Wright Line standard was consistent with the

NLRA.
The First Circuit had ruled that the NLRA required the General Counsel to
prove that the employee would not have been fired had it not been for his union
activities, i.e., that antiunion animus was the predominant motive for the firing. 55
The Supreme Court disagreed, observing that almost since the NLRA was

passed in 1935, the Board had maintained the position that all that was necessary
to find a Section 8(a)(3) violation was that "anti-union animus actually
contributed to the discharge decision."s6 The Court declared, "This construction
of the NLRA-that to establish an unfair labor practice the General Counsel
need show by a preponderance of the evidence only that a discharge is in any
way motivated by a desire to frustrate union activity-was plainly rational and
acceptable.,,57
Turning to the Board's Wright Line standard, the Court pointed out that in
Wright Line the Board reaffirmed that the General Counsel "had the burden of
proving that the employee's conduct protected by § 7 was a substantial or a

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Kelly, supra note 11, at 902-04.
See Kelly, supra note 11, at 902-04.
462 U.S. 393 (1983).
See Kelly, supra note 11, at 905.
Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 395 (citations omitted).
See id. at 397.
ld. at 398.
ld. at 398-99 (emphasis added).
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motivating factor in the discharge."s8 The Court then revealed its interpretation
of what the General Counsel is required to prove at the first stage by noting,
"The Board has not purported to shift the burden of persuasion on the question
of whether the employer fired [the employee] at least in part because he engaged
in protected activities. The General Counsel satisfied his burden in this respect
and no one disputes it."s9 Even after the General Counsel has met this burden,
the Court observed, the Wright Line standard gives the employer an opportunity
to avoid liability under Section 8(a)(3) by proving that even if the employee had
not been involved in union activity, the employer would have taken the same
action against the employee. The Court explained that in giving the employer
this opportunity, even after the General Counsel had proven all that was needed
to establish a Section 8(a)(3) violation, the Wright Line standard made it "clear
... that proof that the discharge would have occurred in any event and for valid
reasons amounted to an affirmative defense on which the employer carried the
burden of pro of by a preponderance of the evidence.,,6o
The Court then explained that the basis for its disagreement with the First
Circuit over the Wright Line standard was that the First Circuit had
misinterpreted Section 10(c) of the NLRA. The Supreme Court noted that the
First Circuit's view was that the burden could not be shifted to the employer
because "[t]he General Counsel ... had the burden of showing not only that a
forbidden motivation contributed to the discharge but also that the discharge
would not have taken place independently of the protected conduct of the
employee.,,61 The Court stated that there was no dispute that, under Section
IO(c) of the NLRA, "throughout the proceedings, the General Counsel carries
the burden of proving the elements of an unfair labor practice." However, the
Supreme Court held, "the Court of Appeals erred in holding that § IO(c) forbids
placing the burden on the employer to prove that absent the improper motivation
he would have acted in the same manner for wholly legitimate reasons.,,62
The Supreme Court then fully set forth the interpretation of the NLRA that
it had sketched out in its summary of the Wright Line standard. The Court began
by explaining:
As we understand the Board's decisions, they have consistently held
that the unfair labor practice consists of a discharge or other adverse
action that is based in whole or in part on anti-union animus-or as the
Board now puts it, that the employee's protected conduct was a

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at 400.
at 400 n.5 (emphasis added).
at 400.
at 400-01.
at 401.
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substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action. The General
Counsel has the burden of proving these elements under § 1O(c).63
The Court thus indicated that proof that antiunion animus was a "partial" cause
of the adverse action was sufficient to sustain the finding of a Section 8(a)(3)
violation.
The Court next explained that in adopting the Wright Line standard, the
Board had given employers an opportunity to escape Section 8(a)(3) liability
even if the General Counsel proved that antiunion animus contributed to the
challenged decision:
[T]he Board's construction of the statute [in Wright Line] permits an
employer to avoid being adjudicated a violator by showing what his
actions would have been regardless of his forbidden motivation. It
extends to the employer what the Board considers to be an affinnative
defense but does not change or add to the elements of the unfair labor
practice that the General Counsel has the burden of proving under §
1o(C).64
The Court added, in a footnote, a statement that succinctly described its view of
what Section 10(c) required: "Section lO(c) places the burden on the General
Counsel only to prove the unfair labor practice, not to disprove an affinnative
defense.,,6s

According to the Supreme Court, the Board's Wright Line standard fell
within a range of pennissible constructions of the NLRA. The Board could have
construed the NLRA as requiring more, or less, from the General Counsel. For
instance, the Board could have construed the NLRA as imposing the additional
requirement demanded by the First Circuit-that the General Counsel bear the
burden of proving that the challenged action would not have taken place but for
the unlawful motive. On the other hand, the Court noted, the Board could have
reasonably concluded that once an unlawful motive was proven, the existence
of other motives was irrelevant to the finding of a violation, and affected only
"the permissible remedy, in which event the burden of proof could surely have
been put on the employer.,,66 Instead, the Board chose the middle ground in

63. ld.
64.ld.
65. ld. at 401 n.6. The Supreme Court also explained that the Wright Line standard
did not conflict with the provision in Section 10(c) that "directed that no order of the
Board reinstate or compensate any employee who was fired for cause," as that provision
was intended to apply only to cases in which antiunion animus played no part in the
employer's decision. ld.
66. ld. at 402. Former NLRB Chairman William Gould argued, in effect, that the
Board should adopt this construction of the NLRA. In Frick Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B.
9, 12 (1995), Chairman Gould contended that in dual motive cases, if antiunion
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making proof of other, legitimate grounds for the challenged decision an
affirmative defense. The Supreme Court ruled that this was a permissible
construction of the NLRA.67
Significantly, the Supreme Court offered a strong policy rationale for why
it was reasonable to shift the burden of proof to the employer under the Wright
Line standard. The Court declared:
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is
declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that
the influence oflegal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because
he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created not by
innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing. 68
Thus, the Supreme Court in Transportation Management held that once the
General Counsel has shown that an employer took an adverse action against an
employee that was even partially based on antiunion animus, that employer can
be considered a "wrongdoer.,,69 As the passage quoted above reveals, that is
because the statute makes such decisions "illegitimate": Employers are not
permitted to take antiunion animus into account in making employment
decisions.

After upholding the Wright Line standard, the Supreme Court affinned the
Board's finding that Transportation Management had violated Section 8(a)(3)
in firing the discriminatee, Mr. Santillo. Significantly, the Supreme Court relied
on evidence of pretext in reaching this conclusion. Specifically, the employer
asserted that it had terminated Mr. Santillo for leaving the ignition keys in his
bus and for taking unauthorized breaks. Although Mr. Santillo had in fact done
these things, the Court agreed with the Board that the record demonstrated that
these were not the trne reasons for his discharge. The evidence of pretext in this
case was similar to that in Wright Line itself: the record showed that the
employer had never before disciplined any employee for the "commonplace"
kinds of actions taken by Mr. Santillo, and that the employer had departed from
its usual practice of issuing warnings before disciplining employees. 7o The
Court concluded that these types of "evidence of pretext" were "substantial
evidence" in support of the Board's conclusion that the employer violated
Section 8(a)(3).71

discrimination played a role in the challenged decision, there is a violation of Section
8(a)(3), and an employer's showing it would have taken the same action anyway should
affect only the remedy in the case.
67. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 402-03 (1983).
68. Id. at 403.

69.Id.
70. Id. at 404.
71. Id. at 405.
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Thus, under Transportation Management, the foundation of the Wright Line
standard, and hence the law of Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, was established:
the General Counsel must prove in its prima facie case that antiunion animus
played a part in the employer's challenged decision. Consequently, the amount
and kind of evidence required for the General Counsel to meet this burden of
proof is of central importance, and is the chief concern of this Article.

C. A Brief Overview of the Operation of the Wright Line
Standard Since Transportation Management
The Board continues to apply the Wright Line standard to most complaints
of violations of Section 8(a)(3). Since the Supreme Court approved the Board's
Wright Line standard in 1983, the Board has fiiled in some of the details on what
is to occur at each stage of adjudication under the Wright Line process.
The Board generally describes the first stage of the Wright Line process as
requiring the General Counsel to establish a "prima facie showing" that the
aggrieved employee's union activity was a "motivating factor" in the employer's
decision to take an adverse action against that employee.72 The General Counsel
may use both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence to make this showing.
But, as the Board noted in Wright Line itself, employers rarely openly reveal
antiunion motivations for actions taken against employees,73 and so direct
evidence of discriminatory motivation is uncommon. 74 Consequently, in most
Section 8(a)(3) cases, the General Counsel relies on circumstantial evidence to
prove its prima facie case.
The Board typically requires the General Counsel to show four
circumstances, or elements, to prove a prima facie case: (1) union activity by the
aggrieved employee, (2) employer knowledge of that employee's union activity,
(3) timing that suggests a link between the employee's activity and the
employer's challenged action, and (4) employer antiunion animus. 75 If the
General Counsel proves each of these elements, then ~e decisionmaker (the ALJ

72. See, e.g., Greg Murrieta, 323 N.L.R.B. 125, 128 (1997); Yesterday's Children,
Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 766, 768 (1996), enforced in relevant part, 115 F.3d 36 (1st Cir.
1997); Best Plumbing Supply, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 143, 143 (1993).
73. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (lst
Cir. 1981).
74. See Brown & Root USA, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1009, 1066 (1995); Interstate

Material Corp., 290 N.L.R.B. 362, 370 (1988), enforced, 902 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1990);
Sahara Las Vegas Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 337, 347 (1987), enforced, 886 F.2d 1320 (9th
Cir. 1989) (examples of decisions observing that direct evidence of unlawful motivation
is rarely available).
75. See, e.g., Yesterday's Children, 321 N.L.R.B. at 768; Olathe Healthcare Ctr.,
Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 54, 58 (1994); Best Plumbing Supply, 310 N.L.R.B. at 143 (examples
of decisions setting forth the required elements of a prima facie case).
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or the Board) will find that the prima facie case of unlawful motivation was
established, and move on to the second stage of the Wright Line process.
At the second stage, "the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that
it would have taken the adverse action against the employee even in the absence
of the protected activity.,,76 If the employer satisfies this burden, then the
Section 8(a)(3) charge against it will be dismissed. On the other hand, if the
employer fails to offer sufficient evidence for its defense, or if the defense is
unpersuasive to the decisionmaker, then the decisionmaker will rule that the
employer has failed to meet its Wright Line burden and is guilty of violating
Section 8(a) (3).

This is the typical pattern of analyzing Section 8(a) (3) claims under the
Wright Line standard, applied by AUs and the Board in hundreds of cases every
year. This Article will now turn to how pretext cases are typically handled by
the Board under the Wright Line standard.

ITr. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'S APPLICATION
OF THE WRIGHT LINE STANDARD TO CASES
INvOLVING EVIDENCE OF PRETEXT

Although, as noted previously, the Board stated in Wright Line that the
standard it was adopting made it unnecessary to distinguish between pretext and
dual motive cases,77 for the first few years following the Wright Line decision,
there was disagreement among members of the Board as to whether the standard
should be applied in cases where the employer's asserted reason was found to
be pretextual. In numerous cases from 1981 to 1983, Board Member Howard
Jenkins expressed his view that Wright Line did not apply to pretext cases. 78 In
the first of these opinions, The Bond Press, Inc.,19 Member Jenkins explained
that he found it unnecessary to rely on Wright Line because "here, after all the
detailed examination of Respondent's reasons for defenses of the discharges, the
upshot is that its reasons must be rejected as untrue, and the case is thus one of
'pretext,' as to which a Wright Line analysis adds nothing."so

76. Best PlumbingSupp/y, 310 N.L.R.B. at 143.
77. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083 nA (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981).
78. See, e.g., Brigadier Indus., 267 N.L.R.B. 559, 559 n.4 (1983); St. Mary's Infant
Home, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1227, 1227 n.2 (1982); The Bond Press, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B.
1227, 1227 n.2 (1981); see also Kelly, supra note 11, at 906-10 (discussing the
disagreement between Member Jenkins and other Board members over the application
of Wright Line to pretext cases).
79. 254 N.L.R.B. 1227 (1981).
80. Id. at 1227 n.2.
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Shortly after Member Jenkins armounced this position, the Board noted in
Limestone Apparel COrp.81 that Wright Line had indicated that the Board would
apply that analysis to all discrimination cases turning on employer motivation.
The Board then explained:
However, we find it unnecessary formally to set forth that analysis in
those cases where an administrative law judge's findings and
conclusions fully satisfy the analytical objectives of Wright Line. ...
Thus, where an administrative law judge has evaluated the employer's
explanation for its action and concluded that the reasons advanced by
the employer were pretextuaI, that determination constitutes a finding
that the reasons advanced by the employer either did not exist or were
not in fact relied upon. 82
A few weeks later in Castle Instant Maintenance/Maid, Inc.,83 Member
Jenkins cited Limestone Apparel as supporting his position.84 The Board
majority in Castle Instant (consisting of Members Fanning and Zimmerman)
responded that it did not. They asserted that:
Limestone holds that the Board will not fmd it necessary to apply the
specific formulaic approach set forth in Wright Line, or to make
reference to an administrative law judge's failure to do so where it
affirms his finding that the respondent's justification for discharge or
discipline against the General Counsel's prima facie showing of
impermissible motivation was pretextua1. 8S
In 1983, Member Jenkins left the Board,56 and by 1984, the Board had
firmly decided that the Wright Line analysis applied to pretext as well as dual
motive cases. That year, in Frank Black Mechanical Services, Inc., 87 the Board
stated, without dissent, "It is clear, however, that the Board's Wright Line
analysis applies to aIl8(a)(3) and (1) discharge cases regardless of the Board's
ultimate conclusion as to motive.,,88 The following year, in Taylor & Gaskin,
Inc.,89 the Board said, "We do not agree with the [administrative law] judge that

81. 255 N.L.R.B. 722 (1981).

82.ld.
83. 256 N.L.R.B. 130 (1981).
84. ld. at 130 n.1.

85.ld.
86. See Pete Early, Sole Black on NLRB Steps Down, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1983.
atAl5.
87. 271 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1984).
88. ld. at 1302 n.1.
89. 277 N.L.R.B. 563 (1985).
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Wright Line does not apply to pretext cases.,,90 Since 1985, Frank Black and
Taylor & Gaskin have been cited many times for the proposition that the Wright
Line analysis unquestionably applies to pretext cases.91
A trace of the pre-1984 opinions that questioned the need to apply the

Wright Line analysis to pretext cases survives in a current doctrine. The Board
has a policy that ALJs are not required to explicitly go through the entire Wright
Line analysis in pretext cases.92 Specifically, where a judge considers the
employer's asserted reasons for the challenged action and concludes that they are
pretextual, the judge need not go through the second, "burden-shifting" stage of
Wright Line. 93 As stated in a 1996 Board decision:
When it is shown that the business reason advanced by the employer
for its action was a pretext-that is, that the reason either does not
exist or was not in fact relied on-it necessarily follows that the
employer has not met its burden and the inquiry is logically at an
end. 94
Implicit in this policy is the view that it is pennissible for an ALJ, and the
Board, to assess the employer's asserted reasons for its action during the initial,
prima facie stage of the Wright Line analysis. This raises the second issue that
generated controversy in the Board's application of Wright Line to pretext cases:

whether the employer's defense and the evidence offered in support of it can be
considered when ruling on the General Counsel's prima facie case. From 1982
until 1992, the Board issued inconsistent decisions on this question. 95 In 1982,
in Hillside Bus COrp.,96 the Board held that "in assessing whether a prima facie
case has been presented, an administrative law judge must view the General
Counsel's evidence in isolation, apart from the respondent's proffered defense.
It is only after the General Counsel's prima facie requirement has been met that

90. ld. at 563 n.2.
91. See, e.g., Ferguson-Williams, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 695, 703 (I 996)(citing Frank
Black, the AU explains: "The [Wright Line] test applies regardless of whether the case
involves pretextual reasons or dual motivation."); Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B.
79, 84 (1994) (ALJ cites Frank Black in holding that "the [Wright Line] test applies
regardless of whether the case involves pretextual reasons or dual motivation."); Casey
Elec., Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 774, 774 n.2 (1994) (Board cites Taylor & Gaskin after stating,
u[W]e do not agree with the judge that Wright Line 'does not apply' to pretext cases.").
92. See Arthur Young & Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 39 (1988), enforced, 884 F.2d 1387
(4th Cir. 1989).
93.ld.
94. Thermon Heat Tracing Servs., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 1035, 1058 (1996), enforced,
143 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 1998).
95. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 75 & nn.9-12 (3d ed. Supp. 1995).
96. 262 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1982).
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an administrative law judge must consider the respondent's defense.,,97 Over the
next ten years, several other Board decisions stated that the respondent
employer's evidence should not be considered in determining whether the
General Counsel had established a prima facie case.98
Meanwhile, in numerous other decisions in the 1980s, the Board tacitly
rejected the Hillside Bus rule by assessing, or adopting ALJ decisions that
assessed, the employer's evidence injudging the sufficiency of the prima facie
case.99 Then, in 1990, in Golden Flake Snack Foods/CO the Board expressly
disavowed a statement by the ALJ that at the prima facie stage the General
Counsel's evidence must be viewed in isolation from the respondent employer's
defense. The Board declared, "We note in this regard that it is the evidence as
presented at the hearing, drawn from whatever source, which precisely
determines whether or not there is a prima facie case of unlawful conduct."lol

Two years later, the Board made clear that it had abandoned the Hillside
Bus limit on the consideration of evidence at the prima facie stage. In Greco &
Haines, Inc.,102 the Board held, "Under Board precedent, a prima facie case may
be established by the record as a whole and is not limited to evidence presented
by the General Counsel. Thus, the absence of any legitimate basis for an action
may form part of the proof of the General Counsel's case.,,103 Since 1992,
several decisions have followed Greco & Haines in holding that the evidence
offered by the employer in its defense can be considered in deciding whether the
General Counsel has met its prima facie case. 104 ill 1996, in Pace Industries, Inc.
(PreciSion Industries),lOs the Board attempted to harmonize this rule with its
inconsistent Hillside Bus precedents. The Board explained:
That the judge must consider the General Counsel's prima facie case
separately from the Respondent's Wright Line defense ... means only
that the judge need not address the Respondent's defense at all unless

97.ld.
98. See, e.g., Cine Enters., Inc., 301 N.L.R.B. 446, 447 (1991), enforced, 978 F.2d
715 (9th Cir. 1992); Bali Blinds Midwest, 292 N.L.R.B. 243, 243 n.2 (1988).
99. See, e.g., Active Transp., 296 N.L.R.B. 431, 432 & n.8 (1989), enforced mem.,
924 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1991); Murd Indus., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 864, 864, 868-70 (1987);
Heritage Manor Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 408, 413 (1984).
100. 297 N.L.R.B. 594 (1990).
101. ld. at 594 n.2 (emphasis added).
102. 306 N.L.R.B. 634 (1992).
103. ld. (citing Golden Flake, 297 N.L.R.B. at 594).
104. See, e.g., Electro-Voice, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1110 n.20 (1996); TNT
Skypak, Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 659, 659 n.2'(1995); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 315 N.L.R.B.
882,890 n.20 (1994) (discharge of Robert Munn), enforced in. relevant part, No. 951924, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 23936, at *7 n.2 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1996); Peter Vitalie
Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 971, 972-73 (1994).
105. 320 N.L.R.B. 661 (1996), enforced, 118 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 1997).
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he first finds that the General Counsel has proved that the Respondent
acted, at least in part, from unlawful motives. It does not mean that
the judge, in determining whether the General Counsel has carried his
prima facie burden, may not consider evidence that also bears on the
Respondent's defense. 106
In sum, by 1993 the Board had resolved two areas of uncertainty: the
Wright Line standard analysis applied to pretext cases, and all record evidence,
including the employer's defense, could be considered in ruling on the prima
facie stage of that analysis. However, several issues remained for the Board to
resolve: (1) what role evidence of pretext should play in assessing the General
Counsel's prima facie case, (2) what elements of the prima facie case could
evidence of pretext be used to support, and (3) how significant a factor could
pretext be in deciding whether a prima facie case of unlawful motive had been
presented?
The Board has not been as explicit in addressing these questions as it was
in resolving the pretext issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs. But as the
Board has considered and discussed evidence of pretext in deciding Wright Line

cases, some principles and patterns have emerged.
In many cases, the Board has found that evidence of pretext served to
establish one or more of the standard elements of the prima facie case. For
example, in Whitesville Mill Service CO.,I07 the Board relied on evidence of
pretext to find that the element of animus was satisfied. The Board stated that,
unlike the ALJ, it did not base its finding of animus on the plant manager's
testimony that he was shocked by the presence of union activity. The Board
explained, "Although we agree that the Respondent harbored union animus, we
find it unnecessary to rely on [the plant manager's] testimony ... Rather we
infer from the pretextual nature of the reasons for the discharge advanced by the
Respondent that the Respondent was motivated by union hostility."IOB
Since Whitesville, the Board has affirmed ALJ decisions that relied on
Whitesville to hold that evidence of pretext is sufficient to prove animuS. I09
Furthermore, both before and after Whitesville, the Board has affirmed other ALJ

106. Id. at 662 n.7 (citation omitted).
107. 307 N.L.R.B. 937 (1992).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Parsippany Hotel Mgmt. Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 114, 129 (1995),
enforced, 99 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Whitesville for the proposition that "even
if there were an absence of proof of unipn animus by Respondent," animus can be
inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the ''pretextual nature of the reasons"
given bytbe Respondent); Horizons Hotel Corp., 312 N.L.R.B. 1212, 1224 n.37 (1993),
enforced, 49 F.3d 795 (1st Cir. 1995) ("It is also inferred from the pretexiual nature of
the reasons for the discharges advanced by the Respondent that the Respondent was
motivated by union hostility." (citing Whitesville, 307 N.L.R.B. 937 (1992»).
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decisions in which the ALJ used evidence of pretext to support a fmding of
animus. 110
The Board has also held that evidence of pretext can be used to establish the
knowledge element of the prima facie case. In 1995, in Montgomery Ward &
Co./ II the Board explained that the employer's knowledge ofa discriminatee's
union activities "need not be established directly . . . but may rest on
circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable inference of knowledge may
be drawn.',112 After listing several examples of evidence that may be used to
infer knowledge, the Board stated:
Finally, the Board has inferred knowledge where the reason given for
the discipline is so baseless, unreasonable, or contrived as to itself
raise a presumption of wrongful motive. Even where the employer's
rationale is not patently contrived, the Board has held that the
'weakness ofan employer's reasons for adverse personnel action can
be a factor raising a suspicion of unlawful motivation.' 113
Thus, in Montgomery Ward, the Board expressly declared that evidence of
pretext is sufficient to prove the element of knowledge.
The Board issued a similar ruling in 1987, in Abbey's Transportation
Services, Inc. 114 In Abbey's, the Board noted that there was no direct evidence
of the employer's knowledge of the discriminatees' union activities, but found
that circumstantial evidence, including the pretextual nature of the reasons given
for the discriminatees' discharges, gave rise to an inference of such
knowledge. liS The Board then explained that "'[t]he same set of circumstances
may be relied upon to support both an inference of knowledge and an inference
of discrimination. ",116 In a few other decisions, the Board has included evidence
of pretext as one of the factors that supported an inference of employer
knowledge of the discriminatee's union activities.lI7

110. See, e.g., Custom Top Soil, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. No. 34, at *1 (1998) (in which
the Board itself stated, ''There remains substantial evidence of animus, particularly
including the Respondent's ... pretextual reasons for not hiring the discriminatees.");
Sports Shinko (Waikiki) Corp., 316 N.L.R.B. 655, 671 (1995); Asociacion Hosp. del
Maestro, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 198,204 (1988); Birch Run Welding & Fabricating, Inc.,

269 N.L.R.B. 756, 765 (1984), enforced, 761 F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1985).
Ill. 316 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1995), enforced, 97 F.3d 1448 (4th Cir. 1996).
112. fd. at 1253.

113. ld. (citations omitted).
114. 284 N.L.R.B. 698 (1987).
115. ld. at 700.
116. ld. at 701 (quoting Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 936, 944 (1978)).
117. See, e.g., Greco & Haines, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 634 (I992); Baumgardner, 288
N.L.R.B. 977, 977 n.4 (1988), enforced, 866 F.2d 1411 (3d Cir. 1988).
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In several cases, rather than fmding that evidence of pretext supports one
of the standard elements of a prima facie case, such as animus or lrnowledge, the
Board has found that pretext is itself an independent element that helps to prove
the prima facie case. For example, in Transmart, Inc. (Cincinnati Truck
Center), 11 8 the Board overturned the ALJ's conclusion that the General Counsel
failed to prove its prima facie case, and found that the prima facie case had been
established by evidence of the discriminatee's union activity, the employer's
knowledge of that activity, statements indicating the employer's animus, and
"the implausibility of the reasons assigned for the warning and discharge at
issue.,,119 Similarly, in Hi-Tech Cable Corp.;20 the Board held:
[B]ased on proof of the Respondent's union animus, its knowledge of
Jones' prounion attitude, and the inference of unlawful motivation
drawn from the assertion of pretextual reasons, we find that the
General Counsel established that Jones' protected conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor in the Respondent's decision not to
hire him.121
In addition to the above cases in which the Board simply included pretext

in its list of the elements supporting the prima facie case, there have been other
cases in which the Board has expressly pointed out that it relied on evidence of
pretext, in addition to standard elements such as animus or lmowledge, in finding
that the General Counsel met its prima facie case. For example, in Ellis (Ellis
EZectric),I22 the Board stated, "In affirming the judge's finding that the credible
evidence establishes a prima facie case of unlawful motivation for the March 9,
1993 layoffs, we make clear that we rely on the pretextual nature of the reasons
the Respondent asserted as its defense."I23 The Board has also affirmed many
ALJ decisions in which the judge identified evidence of pretext as one of the

118. 315 N.L.R.B. 554 (1994), enforced, 117 F.3d 1421 (6th Cir. 1997).
119. ld. at 555.
120. 318 N.L.R.B. 280 (1995), enforced in relevant part, 128 F.3d 271 (5th Cir.
1997).
121. ld. at 293 (emphasis added); see also Lancaster-Fairfield Cmty. Hosp., 303
N.L.R.B. 238, 238 (1991), enforced, 968 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Thus, the judge's
finding that the Respondent's asserted reasons for its actions were pretextual, a finding
which we adopt, when combined with the timing of the transfer decisions after the
Respondent learned of the Union's organizing campaign, Paxton's role as a leading union
supporter, and the questionable handling of his first transfer request, provides an
independent basis for our determination that the Respondent's actions were unlawfully
based on Paxton's union activities.").
122. 315 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1994).
123. ld. at 1187 n.2 (1994) (citations omitted).
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factors that supported the conclusion that the General Counsel had met its prima
facie case. 124
The cases discussed to this point demonstrate that the Board has often relied
on evidence of pretext as an important factor supporting its finding that the
General Counsel proved its prima facie case. In other cases, the Board has relied
even more heavily on pretext fu numerous cases, a showing of pretext has been
the primary reason, or one of the primary reasons, that the Board concluded that
the General Counsel proved its prima facie case.
For example, inActive Transportation,l25 the Board identified pretext as the
most important factor supporting the prima facie case: "The threat ... , the
interrogations ... , the timing of the discharges ... , and most significantly the
pre textual reasons advanced for the discharges are indicative of illegal
motivation for the discharges."126 Similarly, in Richardson Bros. South,127 the
Board held that "particularly in light of the judge's rejection of the Respondent's
stated explanation for refusing to rehire [the discriminatee] ... , the finding that
the Respondent's true motive was an unlawful one is warranted.,,128 fu other
decisions, the Board has concentrated almost exclusively on evidence of pretext
in deciding that the prima facie case was satisfied. l29 Moreover, the Board has
adopted many ALJ decisions that relied almost entirely on evidence of pretext
in finding that the General Counsel met its prima facie case. 130
fu many of the decisions where the Board upheld the prima facie case based
largely on evidence of pretext, the Board relied on the reasoning of a 1966
decision of the Ninth Circuit, Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB,131 which
was cited with approval in Wright Line. J32 In Shattuck Denn, the Ninth Circuit

124. See, e.g., 87-10 51st Ave. Owners Corp., 320 N.L.R.B. 993, 998 (1996);
Braden Mfg., Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 1145, 1148 (1994); Murd Indus., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B.
864,864,868-70 (1987).
125. 296 N.L.R.B. 431 (1989), enforced mem., 924 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1991).
126. ld. at 432 (emphasis added).
127. 312 N.L.R.B. 534 (1993).
128. ld.
129. See, e.g., Beverly Cal. Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (1998) (discharge of
employee Tausch); Fluor Daniel, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 498, 498-500 (1993), enforced in
relevant part, 102 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1996); Mullican Lumber Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 836,
836-37 (1993).
130. See, e.g., Aloha Temp. Serv., Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 972, 974 (1995) (failure to
hire discriminatees Conroy, Clothier, Pietschmann, and Cochard); Adco Elec., Inc., 307
N.L.R.B. 1113, 1126-29 (1992) (discharge of Eric Muncy), enforced, 6 F.3d 1110 (5th
Cir. 1993); Heritage Manor Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 408, 413 (1984)
(discharge of LinneII Key).
131. 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966).
132. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 n.12 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d
899 (1st Cir. 1981).
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upheld the Board's reliance on evidence of pretext in finding that the employer
had unlawfully discharged a union activist. The Ninth Circuit held:
If [the trier of fact] finds that the stated motive for a discharge is false,
he certainly can infer that there is another motive. More than that, he
can infer that the motive is one that the employer desires to concealan unlawful motive-at least where, as in this case, the surrounding
facts tend to reinforce that inference. 133
In Wright Line, the Board specially dropped a footnote, footnote twelve, in order
to assert, based on Shattuck Denn, that "[t]he absence of any legitimate basis for
an action, of course, may form part of the proof of the General Counsel's
case.,,134
In several decisions, the Board has relied on Shattuck Denn or footnote
twelve of Wright Line, or both, to support its position that evidence of pretext
can playa leading role in proving the prima facie case. For example, in Fluor

Daniel, Inc.,l3s the Board opened its examination of the Section 8(a)(3) issue
with a summary of the Wright Line analysis, and then immediately added:
It is also well settled, however, that when a respondent's stated

motives for its actions are found to be false, the circumstances may
warrant an inference that the true motive is an unlawful one that the
respondent desires to conceal. The motive may be inferred from the
total circumstances proved. 136
In Active Transportation, to support its assertion that pretext was the most
significant factor supporting the prima facie case, the Board explained in a
footnote, "If the proffered reason for a discharge is false, one may infer that there
is another reason (an unlawful reason) for the discharge that the employer wishes
to hide, where the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference."J37 The
Board again cited both Shattuck Denn and footnote twelve of Wright Line in its
Mullican Lumber Co. 138 decision in concluding that "we infer from the pretextual
nature of the reason for Richards' termination advanced by the Respondent that
it was motivated by union animus and hostility toward Richards' anticipated
exercise of his Section 7 rights.,,139 In addition, there have been many other

133. Shattuck Denn, 362 F.2d at 470.
134. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088 n.12 (citing Shattuck Denn).
135. 311 N.L.R.B. 498 (1993), enforced in relevant part, 102 F.3d 818 (6th Cir.
1996).
136. [d. at 498 & n.5 (citing Shattuck Denn).
137. 296 N.L.R.B. 431,432 n.8 (1989), enforced mem., 924 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir.
1991) (citing Shattuck Denn and footnote 12 of Wright Line).
138. 310 N.L.R.B. 836 (1993).
139. [d. at 837.
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cases in which the Board has cited Shattuck Denn or footnote twelve of Wright
Line to support its fmding that evidence of pretext helped to establish the prima
facie case. 140
In sum, the Board has repeatedly held that evidence of pretext can be used
to establish the prima facie case. Particularly in those decisions using the
"Shattuck Denn" rationale, evidence of pretext has been the primary, or even the
sole basis, for concluding that the General Counsel proved its prima facie case.
These decisions strongly suggest that evidence of pretext is itself sufficient to
prove a Section 8(a)(3) violation. Evidence of pretext serves to satisfy the fIrst
stage of the Wright Line analysis, and as for the second stage, the fInding of
pretext also undermines any argument by the employer that it had a legitimate
reason for taking the challenged action. 141 Thus, numerous Board decisions have
indicated that a fInding that the employer's asserted reasons for its challenged
action are pretextua1leads to the conclusion, practically as a matter oflaw, that
the challenged action violated Section 8(a) (3). 142
In light of these Board precedents, it is not surprising that at least one ALJ
has concluded that instead of going through the entire Wright Line analysis, one
could rely on a fInding of pretext as an alternative means of determining that the
employer had violated Section 8(a)(3). In Precision Industries, ALJ Thomas
Wilks engaged in the following reasoning:
Because the Board has adopted the Wright Line evidentiary rule with
respect to mixed motivation cases, it did not preclude the possibility
that the General Counsel could sustain his case by proving that the

proffered alleged business reason for the adverse action was entirely
false and pretextual, i.e., there was no mixed motivation at all. Thus
it may be found that where the Respondent's proffered
nondiscriminatory motivational explanation is so consummately false,
even in the absence of direct evidence of knowledge of and animus
toward the protected activity, the trier offact is constrained to infer
unlawful motivation. [citing Shattuck Denn]. The Board, however,
often construes the record which discloses such falsity of proffered
explanation as in the nature of a respondent having failed to meet its

140. See, e.g., Poly-America, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1999); Richardson Bros.
S., 312 N.L.R.B. 534, 534 (1993) (citing Shattuck Denn); Weco Cleaning Specialists,
Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 310, 310 nA (1992) (citing Shattuck Denn and footnote 12 of Wright
Line); Whitesville Mill Servo Co., 307 N.L.R.B. 937, 937 (1992) (citing Shattuck Denn);
Lancaster-Fairfield Cmty. Hosp., 303 N.L.R.B. 238, 238 (citing Shattuck Denn and
footnote 12 of Wright Line).
141. See, e.g., Richardson Bros., 312 N.L.R.B. at 540 ("In light of the judge's
further rejection of the Respondent's proffered reason for its action, the Respondent
clearly failed to carry its burden of showing that it would have taken the same action with
respect to Rawls absent his union activity.").
142. See supra text accompanying notes 125-40.
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Wright Line burden of proof. However, the Board has recently made
it clear that it adheres to the Shattuck Denn rationale as it has stated
in a case of falsity of defense: 'The Board is entitled to infer that the
Respondent's true motive was unlawful, i.e., because of the
[discriminatee's] protected activity: 143
... [W]e are confronted with an astonishing body of inconsistences,
contradictions, improbabilities, and aberrational and shifting
explanations that are so gross as to permit no room for any conclusion
other than that such testimony was the product of deliberate mendacity
or a total malfunction of all of the Respondent witnesses' recollective
capacities. I conclude that such testimony necessarily compels the
conclusion that Respondent's true motivation for implementing any
kind of a screening-testing-physical examination procedure at the
Malvern plant in the fall of 1989 was unlawful, i.e., discriminatory
under the Act. ... I further find that the General Counsel has proven
by virtue ofsuch evidence that Respondent was possessed ofno other
nondiscriminatory motivation and that all references thereto by
Respondent's agents are false and pretextual. 144

Notably, ALJ Wilks's opinion described reliance on evidence of pretext to
prove a Section 8(a)(3) violation as the "Shattuck Denn rationale." Indeed, ALJ
Wilks's reasoning seems completely consistent with the line of Board precedents
that ~elied on Shattuck Denn or footnote twelve of Wright Line in holding that
evidence of pretext could establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 14s
However, the Board, in its 1996 review of ALJ Wilks's decision in Precision
Industries, expressly disavowed his reasoning. l46 The Board's bases for doing
so, and its decision in Precision Industries, will be discussed more fully in
Part IV.C. 147 For now, the salient point is that the Board's ruling in Precision
Industries was influenced, at least in part, by judicial developments, the subject
to which this Article now turns.

143. Pace Indus., Inc. (Precision Indus.), 320 N.L.R.B. 661, 707 (1996), enforced,
F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 1997) (emphases added) (quoting Williams Contracting, Inc., 309
f'l.L.R.B. 433 (1992)),
144. ld. (emphases added).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 131-40.
146. See Precision Indus., 320 N.L.R.B. at 661 & n.4.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 295-302.
ll~
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JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PRETEXT CASES

A. The Federal Courts ofAppeals' Responses to the National
Labor Relations Board's Approach to Pretext
After the Supreme Court upheld the Wright Line standard in 1983, for the
next several years the federal courts of appeals engaged in little discussion of the
Board's practice of relying on evidence of pretext to find violations of Section
8(a) (3). In numerous cases, courts of appeals, with at most limited discussion,
affinned the Board's rulings that evidence of pretext could be used to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. 148 In a few decisions, courts questioned in
dicta whether the Board could consider the employer's reasons for the
challenged action at the prima facie stage of the Wright Line analysis. 149 But on
both sides of the pretext issue, courts of appeals did not thoroughly examine the
subject until the 1990s.
The first circuit court to engage in a substantial discussion of how the Board
should treat evidence of pretext was the Second Circuit, in its second decision
in HolD-Krome Co. v. NLRB.Iso The HolD-Krome case had a protracted history,
coming before the Board twice and the Second Circuit three times. The

underlying discrimination charge in Holo-Krome was that the company had
violated Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA in refusing to rehire from layoff
in 1986 two employees, Mr. Pace and Mr. Rutkauski, who had been active in a
union campaign the year before. lSI
In its first decision, the Board explained that its conclusion that the General
Counsel had established its first stage case was based in part on evidence of
pretext. The Board relied on the "Shattuck Denn" rationaIe lS2 by asserting, "The
Board's decision in Wright Line did not disturb the well-established principle
that if the stated motive for a discharge (or refusal to hire) is false, the trier of

148. See, e.g., Property Res. Corp. v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 964,967 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(noting that the Board's reliance on pretext, and on other factors, was "amply supported
by precedent"); Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 820 F.2d 453, 460-61, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(court relied on "pretextual reasons" to find Section 8(a)(3) violations in discharges of
David Huckeba, Danny Ray Rowell, and suspension of Buford Amburgey); Turnbull
Cone Baking Co. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Anti-union motivation
may reasonably be inferred from a variety of factors, such as . '.. the inconsistencies
between the proffered reason and other actions of the employer •...").
149. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Die Casting Corp., 728 F.2d 959,961 (7th Cir.
1984) ("The National Labor Relations Act does not require a company to give reasons
for laying off a worker .... We thus have disapproved the drawing of an inference of
improper motive from the fact that the employer is unable to give a good reason for firing
or laying off a worker who happens to be a union supporter.").
150. 947 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1991).
151. Holo-Krome Co., 293 N.L.R.B. 594, 594-96 (1989).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.

912

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6S

fact may infer that there is another motive that the employer wishes to
conceal-an unlawful motive-where the surrounding facts tend to reinforce
that inference."IS3 Applying the Shattuck Denn rationale to the facts, the Board
concluded that the falsity ofHolo-Krome's asserted reasons for not rehiring Mr.
Pace and Mr. Rutkauski "reinforces the inference that the Respondent's true
reasons were unlawful."ls4
The Second Circuit overturned the Board's fmding of a Section 8(a)(3)
violation, but did so almost entirely on the ground that the Board had erred in
considering Holo-Krome's lawful expressions of opposition to unionization as
evidence of animus. ISS The Second Circuit remanded the case to the Board to
reconsider whether the refusal to rehire Mr. Pace and Mr. Rutkauski was
unlawfully motivated, without reference to the employer's lawful antiunion
statements. IS6 On remand, the Board again found that Holo-Krome's failure to
rehire the employees violated Section 8(a)(3).\S7 The Board again relied on the
Shattuck Denn rationale in holding that evidence of pretext could be used to
establish the first stage case. ISS
The Second Circuit also overturned the Board's second decision, and this
time the court squarely addressed the Board's finding that evidence of pretext
supported the first stage case. InHolo-Krome Co. v. NLRB (Holo-Krome II), 159
the Second Circuit ruled that when the Board had considered Holo-Krome's
proffered reasons for its action at the first stage of the analysis, the Board had
"misallocated" the burden of proof. 160 According to the court, those reasons

should not be considered until the second stage of the Wright Line analysis. The
court explained that because the "ALJ in this case found that the General
Counsel failed to make an adequate prima facie case, Holo-Krome's

153. Holo-Krome, 293 N.L.R.B. at 596 (citing Shattuck Denn and footnote 12 of
Wright Line).
154.ld.
155. Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB (Holo-Krome 1),907 F.2d 1343, 1345-47 (2d Cir.
1990). The Second Circuit reasoned that this was contrary to Section 8(c) of the NLRA,
which protects employer communications regarding unionization so long as they do not
contain threats against employees or promises of benefits. ld. The Second Circuit's
ruling on the "employer speech" issue conflicts with the current position of the Board,
and some other courts of appeals. This conflict over the "employer speech" issue has
received some scholarly attention. See, e.g., Ian Adams & Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., Free
Speech and Administrative Agency Deference: Section 8(c) and the National Labor
Relations Board-An Expostulation on Preserving the First Amendment, 22 J. CONTEMP.
L. 19 (1996); Rebecca Hanner White, The Statutory and Constitutional Limits of Using
Protected Speech as Evidence of Unlawfol Motive under the National Labor Relations
Act, 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 1 (1992).
156. Holo-Krome 1,907 F.2d at 1347.
157. See Holo-Krome Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 452 (1991).
158. Id. at 452.
159. 947 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1991).
160. Id. at 592.
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explanations of why it acted as it did toward Pace and Rutkauski were not
initially at issue.,,161 Therefore, the court reasoned, "The Board ... should not
have evaluated Holo-Krome's rebuttal evidence until it found that the General
Counsel had indeed presented an adequate prima facie case.,,162 After holding
that the evidence of pretext should not have been considered in assessing the
General Counsel's prima facie case, the Second Circuit found that the remaining
evidence was insufficient to support that prima facie case, and therefore the case
against Holo-Krome must be dismissed. 163
The Board petitioned the Second Circuit for rehearing of the Holo-Krome
II case, and particularly asked the court to reconsider its ruling that the Board
had erred in examining the validity of the employer's reasons for its challenged
action at the prima facie stage of the case. In its petition, the Board "vigorously
urg[ed]" the court not to bar the Board from considering evidence of pretext in
its review of the prima facie case, "contending that the decision to give such
consideration to the employer's explanation is within the administrative
competence of the Board and that the Board has regularly done so in the past."I64
The Second Circuit agreed to clarify its decision in Halo-Krome II, finding that
"our prior opinion in this case requires a slight refinement.,,16S In Holo-Krome
Co. v. NLRB (Halo-Krome 111),166 the Second Circuit's final decision in the
Holo-Krome case, the court engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the appropriate
role of evidence of pretext in the Wright Line analysis, and the decision is
recognized as an important statement on that issue. 167
In Holo-Krome III, the Second Circuit recognized that when the Board
applies the Wright Line standard, it "uses the phrase 'prima facie case' to mean

the General Counsel's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
protected activity was at least part of the motivation for the employer's adverse
action."168 The court observed that this definition of the prima facie stage of the
Wright Line analysis was approved by the Supreme Court in Transportation
Management. 169 But the Second Circuit also pointed out that this definition of
"prima facie" was different from the meaning of the phrase in other contexts,
when it can mean a quantum of facts sufficient to require the defendant to

161. ld.
162. ld.
163. ld. at 592-95.
164. Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB (Holo-Krome III), 954 F.2d 108, 109-10 (2d Cir.
1992).
165. ld. at 110.
166. 954 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1992).
167. See Hardin, supra note 6, at 82 (discussing Holo-Krome's assessment of the
Board's approach to evidence of pretext); Union-Tribune Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 1 F.3d
486,491 (describing Holo-Krome as a "scholarly opinion" on'the Board's approach to
evidence of pretext).
168. Holo-Krome III, 954 F.2d at 111.
169. ld. at 111-12.
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present an affinnative defense. 17o Therefore, the Second Circuit recommended
that the Board cease using the phrase "prima facie case" to describe the first
stage of the Wright Line standard. 171 As will be discussed below, other circuit
courts have joined the Second Circuit in calling for the Board to stop using the
phrase "prima facie case," and the Board has responded to this advice. In
The Second Circuit next began to examine the central issue before it,
whether the Board could consider the pretextual nature of the employer's reasons
for its actions at the prima facie stage of the Wright Line analysis. The court
focused on footnote twelve of the Wright Line decision, the footnote in which the
Board, relying on Shattuck Denn, had stated, "'The absence of any legitimate
basis for an action may, of course, form part of the proof of the General
Counsel's case.",173 The court found that the scope of the principle expressed
in the footnote was unclear:

It was not clear in Shattuck Denn, and it became no clearer in footnote
12 of Wright Line, whether the Board thought that the absence of an
employer's legitimate basis for its adverse action could be gleaned
only from the employer's failure to provide a credible explanation to
the employee during the episode or also from the failure to provide a
credible explanation to the administrative law judge during the Board
hearing. 174

170. ld. at 111.
171. ld. at 112 ('Though we now lrnow that the Board uses the phrase 'prima facie
case' to mean evidence that proves that protected conduct was a motivating factor, it
would be helpful if the Board would abandon the phrase, in view of its entirely different
meaning in other contexts, and adopt some terminology that connotes proof of the
elements of liability.").
172. See infra note 214 (Fourth Circuit suggests Board no longer use the phrase
prima facie case); infra notes 278-87 and accompanying text (D.C. Circuit recommends
that Board abandon use of the phrase); infra notes 288-94 and accompanying text
(Board's discussion ofthese recommendations). In Part V, this Article recommends that
the Board follow these courts' advice and should discontinue using the term "prima
facie" to refer to the General Counsel's burden under the Wright Line standard. See infra
text accompanying notes 431-33. However, most Board decisions, and some court
decisions, continue to use the term "prima facie" in referring to the first stage of the
Wright Line process. Consequently, many quotations of cases in this Article include the
term "prima facie." Therefore, to avoid the confusion that would be created by
differences in terminology between the quotations and the original language of this
Article, this Article continues to use the phrase "prima facie" to refer to the first stage of
the Wright Line process.
173. Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB (Holo-Krome III), 954 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir.
1992) (quoting Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 n.l2 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d
899 (1st Cir. 1981».
174. ld. (emphasis added).
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The court then summarized the Board's inconsistent precedents on whether the
defense offered by the employer at the hearing can be considered when ruling
on whether the General Counsel has met its prima facie burden. 175
The Second Circuit determined that, despite the "needless confusion"
created by the conflicting Board decisions, "there appears to be a consistent rule
in practice."176 The court described that rule as follows:
The Board wants the ALI to make an initial determination as to
whether the General Counsel ha5 proved that protected activity was
part of the motivation of the employer's conduct. In making that
determination, the ALI may use all of the record evidence. This
clearly includes whatever explanation the employer gave to the
employees during the episode, and, it apparently also includes the
explanation that the employer presented at the hearing. Where the
Board draws the line, however, is in the consideration of the

employer's affirmative defense. That defense is not to be considered
until the ALI has determined that the General Counsel has presented
a prima facie case. Thus, the employer's explanation/or the action it
took can be assessed in determining whether a prima facie case has
been shown, but the employer's affirmative defense as to the action
it would have taken ifno improper motivation had existed cannot be
assessed until the prima facie case has been proven. 177
This passage in Holo-Krome III was not really a description of what the
Board had done in pretext cases, but was more a recital of what the Second
Circuit decided the Board should do. The differentiation between evidence
regarding "the action the employer took" and evidence regarding "the action the
employer would have taken" did not derive from Board precedents, but from a
distinction the Second Circuit itself drew between pretext cases and dual motive
decision. 178 The passage implied that
cases earlier in its Holo-Krome
although an ALJ and the Board could consider employer explanations in the
record in assessing the prima facie case, they could not rule on the validity of the
employer explanations underlying the employer's affirmative defense until after
they concluded that the General Counsel had proven its prima facie case.
The Second Circuit then explained, essentially, that the appropriate
determinant of whether evidence of the employer's reasons for its action could
be considered in assessing the prima facie case was how that evidence had been

m

175. See supra notes 95-106 and accompanying text. That earlier discussion
explains that the Board finally resolved that conflict in Greco & Haines, Inc., 306
N.L.R.B. 634 (1992), issued two months after the Second Circuit's last decision in HoloKrome I/l.
176. Holo-Krome III, 954 F.2d at 113.
177. ld. (emphases added).
178. See id. at llO.
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brought into the record. "Obviously," the court declared, "the General Counsel's
'prima facie case' cannot consist of evidence that the General Counsel has failed
to elicit.,,179 This brought the court to its clarification of its earlier opinion in
Holo-Krome II:
The point we sought to make in our original opinion was that the
General Counsel's prima facie case could not include explanations of
the employer that the General Counsel had not elicited. To whatever
extent the opinion might be read to imply that the prima facie case
cannot include assessment by the ALJ of the employer's explanation
as elicited by the General Counsel (whether the explanation was
offered during the episode or during the hearing), the opinion was a
shade too broad. And, if the employer elects to offer evidence
rebutting the General Counsel's prima facie case (whether or not
framed as an affirmative defense), the ALJ is entitled to assess the
entire record in determining whether the prima facie case remains
proven. ISO
The Second Circuit thus held that evidence regarding the employer's reasons for
the challenged action could be considered by an ALJ and the Board in assessing
the General Counsel's prima facie case, as long as that evidence was presented
as part of the General Counsel's case, or was offered by the employer to rebut
the General Counsel's case. lSI
Following the Second Circuit's decision in Holo-Krome III, the Board
issued a series of decisions in 1992 and 1993 in which the Board asserted that
its practice of considering evidence of pretext in assessing the General Counsel's
prima facie case was consistent with the Second Circuit's decision. 1s2 In each
of these decisions, the Board quoted the passage from Holo-Krome III stating
that the Board could consider "the entire record" in determining whether
unlawful motivation was proven. Thus, the Board has read Halo-Krome III as
endorsing its policy of considering evidence of pretext in evaluating the prima
facie case. The Board has never discussed the limitations that Holo-Krome III
suggested the Board should observe in relying on evidence of pretext.

179. ld. at 113.
180. ld. (emphases added).
181. The Second Circuit did recognize that, in practice, it would be difficult to
discern exactly how evidence of the employer's reasons came into the record, because
''the employer's testimony will probably not be particularly precise in distinguishing
between the reason for the adverse action actually taken and the reason that would have
motivated the adverse action in the absence of protected activity." ld. at 113-14.
182. See Diesel Truck Driving Training Sch., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 963, 964 (1993);
Williams Contracting, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 433, 433 n.2 (1992); Weco Cleaning
Specialists, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 310, 310 n.4 (1992); Greco & Haines, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B.
634 (1992).
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The 3eventh Circuit relied on Holo-Krome HI in Union-Tribune Publishing
Co. v. NLRB,183 the Seventh Circuit's leading ruling on whether the Board can
consider evidence of pretext in evaluating the prima facie case. The UnionTribune case involved the discharge of Ms. Nancy Tetrault, a district manager
and member of the Newspaper Guild's bargaining committee. In ALJ Gerald
Waclmov's decision in the case, his conclusion that Ms. Tetrault's discharge was
unlawful was based almost entirely on his finding that the employer's asserted
reasons for terminating her were pretextual. 184 In particular, the ALJ found that
the alleged bases for Ms. Tetrault's discharge were all practices that were
routinely engaged in by many district managers, and that these practices had
never been the basis for discipline of any other district manager. 18S On appeal
to the Board, the employer challenged the ALJ's reliance on evidence of pretext,
arguing that the ALJ had "incorrectly bootstrapped his finding that the
Respondent's reasons for the termination of Tetrault were pretextual into a
conclusion that the Respondent's pretext established union animus.,,186 The
Board rejected the employer's argument, identifying a number of other factors
discussed by the judge that also indicated animus. The Board ruled, "Based on
the foregoing factors, as well as the judge's finding that the Respondent's
asserted reasons for its action were pretextual, we conclude that the judge's
inference of antiunion animus was well supported by the surrounding
circumstances.,,187
In its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Union-Tribune contended that the ALJ
had failed to comply with Wright Line's two-step analysis, which the employer
argued "requires an initial finding that protected activity motivated the
employer's action, and only then examines whether the employer's proffered
reasons for the action were pretextual.,,188 The employer further claimed that the
Board had perpetuated the ALJ's error by identifying pretext as one of the
factors supporting a finding of unlawful motivation. Therefore, Union-Tribune
maintained, "the Board's approach still inverts the proper procedure for
analyzing NLRA violations.,,189
The Seventh Circuit rejected Union-Tribune's challenge to the Board's use
of evidence of pretext. The Seventh Circuit relied on the Second Circuit's
decision in Holo-Krome HI, noting that "[t]he Second Circuit recently published
a scholarly opinion upholding the Board's new approach and concluding that it

183. 1 F.3d486 (7th Cir. 1993).
184. See Union-Tribune Publ'g Co., 307 N.L.R.B. 25, 48-51 (1992), enforced, 1
F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1993) (analysis by ALJ Wacknov).
185. ld.; see also Union-Tribune, 1 F.3d at 492 (Seventh Circuit affinns this
finding of the ALJ).
186. Union-Tribune, 307 N.L.R.B. at 25.

187. ld. (emphasis added).
188. Union-Tribune, 1 F.3d at 490.
189. ld.
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is not inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent."I90 The Seventh Circuit added
that, in its own past decisions, it had also "approved reliance on an employer's
implausible explanations to support the General Counsel's prima facie case,"
though the court noted that its prior decisions had not distinguished between
employer explanations given at the time of the challenged action and
explanations provided at the unfair labor practice hearing. 191 Based on HoloKrome III and its own past precedents, the Seventh Circuit declared, "we
endorse the ALJ's use ofUnion-Tribune's explanations here."192
The Seventh Circuit immediately imposed a limitation on its endorsement,
stating that it agreed with Union-Tribune's assertion that "even if an ALJ may
consider the employer's explanation in assessing the prima facie case, the ALJ
m~y not rest -its entire decision on tjlat ground."193 The court explained, "It is
inaccurate to state, as a general matter, that once a finding is made that an

employer's proposedjustific~tion is pretextual, the analysis of the employer's
motivation is at an end ..'. Afin.ding of pretext, standing alone, does not support
a ,conclusion that a firing was improperly motivated.,,194 The court went on to
find that, in this particUlar case, the other evidence of animus that supplemented
the fiilding of pretext'was sufficient to uphold the Board's judgment that UnionTribune's discharge of Ms. Tetrault violated Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 195
For. the purpose of reviewing Board policies, the most important court of
appeals is the District of Columbia Circllit, because Section 10(t) of the NLRA
provides that "any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board" may obtain
review of that order in the D.C. Circuit. 196 Consequently, if the D.C. Circuit
were to rule that the Board cannot consider evidence of pretext in assessing the
prima facie case, and the Supreme Court did not review that decision, then in any
case where the Board did consider evidence of pretext at the prima facie stage,
the employer could simply appeal to the D.C. Circuit to have that decision

190. [d. at 491 (citing Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB (Holo-Krome III), 954 F.2d 108,
113 (2d Cir. 1992»:
191. Id. (citing NLRB v. Indus. Erectors, Inc., 712 F.2d 1131, 1137 (7th Cir.
1983); NLRB v. Rich's Precision Foundry, Inc., 667 F.2d 613, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1981».
192. Id. As recently as 1998, the Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed its position that
it is appropriate for the Board to consider evidence presented by the employer in
assessing whether the General Counsel has proven its "prima facie" case. In NLRB v.
GATX Logistics, Inc., 160 F.3d 353,356 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit stated,
"Whether the General Counsel has carried the burden of persuasion is. ',' [a question]
that will usually be addressed at the conclusion of the hearing. Indeed, Board precedent
indicates that the answer to this question must be based on the record as a whole,
including whatever evidence the employer has presented."
193. Union-Tribune Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 1993).
194. Id. (citing NLRB v. Hawkins Constr. Co., 857 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1988);
Roper Corp. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 306, 310-11 (7th Cir. 1983».

195. ld. at 491-92.
196. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994).
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overturned. Therefore, it is significant that the D.C. Circuit has held, in a
number of decisions, that the Board can rely on evidence of pretext in
determining that the General Counsel has proven a prima facie case.
In November 1994, in Power, Inc. v. NLRB,197 in a two-to-one panel

decision, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Board's ruling that the employer had
violated Section 8(a)(3) in refusing to rehire employee Robert Dillen, a ruling
that rested largely on the Board's judgment that the employer's reasons for
refusing to hire Mr. Dillen were pretextual. 198 The D.C. Circuit, after discussirlg
the evidence concerning the employer's reasons for rejecting Mr. Dillen, held
that "[u]nder these circumstances, the Board could reasonably find that the
decision not to rehire Dillen was based on antiunion animus, and conclude that
the company's post-hoc explanation of the decision was 'pretextual.",I99 Judge
Karen LeCraft Henderson dissented from this portion of the majority decision,
contending that "the question of pretext 'does not even enter the picture until
some evidence of a discriminatory discharge has been brought forward. ",200
Again in 1995, in Laro Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,2°1 a D.C. Circuit panel
majority upheld the Board's consideration of pretext at the prima facie stage.
The Board had found that Laro Maintenance, a cleaning contractor that had
taken over the cleaning of a government building from a unionized contractor,
had violated Section 8(a)(3) in refusing to hire thirteen of the employees of the
previous contractor?02 In its decision, the D.C. Circuit assessed Laro's argument
that the Board's finding ofa prima facie case was not supported by substantial
evidence.203 In the course of that discussion, the court observed that the Board's
finding of a prima facie case was based in part on its determination that Laro's
explanations for refusing to hire the thirteen workers were pretextual.204
Specifically, Laro's assertion that it had rejected those workers in favor of
"better quality employees" was belied by evidence showing that Laro hired
workers whom it knew had poor work records and workers with no relevant
experience, and that Laro had made no effort to investigate the quality of the
predecessor contractor's employees. 205
In upholding the Board's decision, the D.C. Circuit noted approvingly that
"the Board has held that a 'case of discriminatory motivation may be supported
by consideration of the lack of any legitimate basis for a respondent's actions,'"
adding that "[t]his is especially true when the employer presents a legitimate

197.
198.
199.
200.
1994».
201.
202.
203.

40 F.3d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
See id. at 419-20.
ld. at 420.
ld. at 426 (quoting Goldtex, Inc. v. NLRB, 14 F.3d 1008, 1012 (4th Cir.
56 F.3d224 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
/d. at 226-27.

See id. at 228-32.

204. See id. at 230.
205. See id. at 231.
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basis for its actions which the factfinder concludes is pretextual."206 The court
then held that reliance on evidence of pretext at the prima facie stage is
appropriate, stating that in cases where the employer's reasons for its action are
deemed pretextual, "the factfinder may not only properly infer that there is some
other motive, but 'that the motive is one that the employer desires to
conceal-an unlawful motive-at least where ... the surrounding circumstances
tend to reinforce that inference. ",207
The D.C. Circuit did indicate that there were limits on the extent to which
the Board could rely on pretext, by quoting Union-Tribune's statement that '''A
finding of pretext, standing alone, does not support a conclusion that [an
employment action] was improperly motivated. ",208 The court went on to fmd
that in this case the evidence of pretext, along with other factors, was sufficient
to support the prima facie case.209
Thus, in the past several years, the Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have

expressly approved, with some limitations, the Board's policy that evidence of
pretext can be used to establish the prima facie case. The Fifth Circuit, with less
discussion, has also upheld that policy.2IO
Beginning in 1994, the Fourth Circuit has issued conflicting rulings on the
role of evidence of pretext in the "prima facie stage" of the case. In the 1994
decision Goldtex, Inc. v. NLRB,211 a three judge panel of the Fourth Circuit,
consisting of Judge Wilkinson, Judge Hamilton, and a federal district court judge
sitting by designation, held that evidence of pretext should not be considered in
the first stage of the Wright Line process. In Goldtex, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the Board's finding that evidence showing that the employer's reasons for firing
two union supporters were pretextual could be used to support the prima facie
case. The Fourth Circuit held, "Evidence of pretext, if such it be, does not even
enter the picture until some evidence of discriminatory discharge has been
brought forward.,,212

206. [d. at 230 (quoting Weco Cleaning Specialists, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 310, 310
n.4 (1992); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 n.12 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981».
207. [d. (quoting Shattuck Denn Mining Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir.
1966».
208. Id. (alteration and emphasis added by Lara Maintenance) (quoting UnionTribune Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 486,491 (7th Cir. 1993».
209. Id. at 231. The D.C. Circuit also upheld the Board's consideration of
evidence of pretext in Southwest Merchandising Corp. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir.
1995), a decision that is discussed in Part IV.C. of this Article. See infra text
accompanying notes 274-82.
210. See NLRB v. ADCO Elec., Inc., 6 F.3d 1110, 1119 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that "[e]vidence which tends to suggest that the stated reasons are pretext is relevant in
determining if an unlawful motive can be inferred").
211. 14 F.3d 1008 (4th Cir. 1994).
212. Id. at 1012; see also Power, Inc. v. NLRB, 40 F.3d 409, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
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In 1997, inNLRB v. eWI o/Maryland, Inc.,213 a panel of three other judges
of the Fourth Circuit (Judges Michael, Motz, and Niemeyer) took a different
position on whether evidence regarding the employer's proffered reasons should
be considered at the first stage of the Wright Line process. Relying on the
Second Circuit's decision in Holo-Krome III, the Fourth Circuit panel declared
that "an ALJ must consider the entire record" in determining whether the
General Counsel has proven its prima facie case.214 But in contrast to the Second
Circuit in Holo-Krome III, and the other circuit court decisions previously
discussed, the Fourth Circuit did not find that evidence presented by CWI had
supported the General Counsel's case. Instead, the. Fourth Circuit asserted that
the employer's evidence oflegitimate reasons for its action effectively rebutted
the General Counsel's prima facie case. In eWI, the Fourth Circuit noted its
acceptance of the Board's holding in Wright Line that "[t]he absence of any
legitimate basis for an [employer's] action, of course, may form part of the proof
of the General Counsel's case," but the court immediately added its own view
that "[c]onversely, the presence ofa legitimate explanation may work to negate
the General Counsel's case.,,2IS
In 1998, in Medeco Security Locks, Inc. v. NLRB,216 the Fourth Circuit
reaffirmed the position it took in eWI, holding, "Of course, the absence of a
legitimate basis for an employer's action may form part of the proof of the
General Counsel's case, while the presence of legitimate reasons can work to
negate proof of antiunion animUS.,,217 Neither in Medeco nor eWI does the
Fourth Circuit refer to its contradictory decision in Goldtex, but at this point it
seems fair to conclude that the Fourth Circuit has practically overruled Goldtex,
particularly given that Chief Judge Wilkinson, who wrote the Goldtex opinion,
joined the majority opinion in Medeco.
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has rendered inconsistent
decisions on whether evidence of the employer's reason for its challenged action
can be considered at the first stage of the Wright Line process. In 1993, in NLRB

(Henderson, 1., dissenting) (relying on Goldtex in contending that ''the question of
pretext" should not be considered until after a prima facie case has been established).
213. 127 F.3d319 (4th Cir. 1997).
214. ld. at 332 n.8. The Fourth Circuit in CWI also announced another point of
agreement with the Second Circuit's decision in Holo-Krome JJl: "Because of the
continuing confusion surrounding the nature of the General Counsel's burden, we agree
with those courts who have suggested that the Board no longer use the term 'prima facie
case' in the Wright Line context." ld. at 331 n.7.
.
215. ld. at 332. As is discussed below, the Fourth Circuit's view that a "legitimate
explanation ... negate[s]" the prima facie case is in conflict with Wright Line and
Tra1lSportation Management. See infra notes 322, 344.
. 216. 142 F.3d 733 (4th Cir. 1998).
217. ld. at 742 (citingNLRB v. CWI of Maryland, Inc., 127 F.3d319, 332 (4th
Cir. 1997».
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v. Vemco, Inc.,218 the Sixth Circuit expressed disapproval of the Board's reliance
on "inconsistencies between the proffered reason for the discharge and other
actions of the employer" as a factor supporting the prima facie case.219 In dicta,

the court commented, "A real question arises here as to the appropriateness of
this factor. Technically, the [General Counsel's] prima facie case should be
evaluated before evidence is heard on Vemco's affirmative defense. This means
Vemco's reasons for the layoff should not even be in evidence when the
existence of the inference of causation is being considered.,,220 On the other
hand, in at least two decisions since Vemco, the Sixth Circuit has, with little or
no discussion, upheld the Board's practice of considering pretext in assessing the
prima facie case. 221
In sum, during the past several years, the federal courts of appeals have
issued a range of opinions on whether it is appropriate for the Board to consider
evidence of pretext in assessing whether the General Counsel has proven its
prima facie case. To date, the Supreme Court has never entered this fray to
directly address the Board's use of evidence of pretext in evaluating the prima
facie case. However, since 1992, the Supreme Court has issued three decisions
outside the context of the NLRA that could have implications for the Board's
treatment of pretext. This Article will now discuss these Supreme Court
decisions, and their possible bearing on pretext cases under the NLRA.

218. 989 F.2d 1468 (6th Cir. 1993).
219. ld. at 1479.
220. ld. at 1479 n.12. The comment was dicta because the court went on to find
that the record did not actually support the finding of "inconsistencies," and so the factor
did not exist at all. ld. at 1479-80.
221. See, e.g., NLRB v. Taylor Mach. Prods., Inc., 136 F.3d 507,515 (6th Cir.
1998); Dunham's Athleisure Corp. v. NLRB, No. 95-6321, 1996 U.S. App. LEXlS
39934, at *10, *13-14 (6th Cir. Nov. 7,1996) (unpublished decision); see also Turnbull
Cone Baking Co. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 292,297 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussed supra note
148).
In recent years, the Sixth Circuit has also changed its position on whether Wright
Line should even apply to all types of Section 8(a)(3) cases. In 1996, in NLRB v. Fluor
Daniel, Inc., 102 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth Circuit held that the first stage of
the Wright Line standard should not be applied to refusal to hire cases, and should be
replaced in such cases by application of the McDonnell Douglas standard from
discrimination law. ld. at 831-34. In 1998, the Sixth Circuit withdrew its 1996 opinion
in Fluor Daniel, and issued anew opinion. See NLRB v. Fluor Daniel Inc., 161 F.3d 953
(6th Cir. 1998). In its new decision, the Sixth Circuit also withdrew its substitution of
a new standard for refusal to hire cases, declaring that "[h]appily, this case does not
require us to decide whether the principles of McDonnell Douglas can or should be
grafted onto the Wright Line test, because even under the unadorned Wright Line analysis
the NLRB has failed to carry its burden." ld. at 966. The Sixth Circuit then interpreted
the Wright Line standard as requiring the General Counsel to prove in the first stage, in
refusal to hire cases, that the employer had available positions that the discrirninatee was
qualified to fill. ld. at 966-68.
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B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
1. St. Mary's Honor Center v. HicJci222
Hicks is a landmark employment discrimination decision under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964." In Hicks, the Supreme Court resolved a division
among the federal courts of appeals over whether, in an employment
discrimination case under Title VII, "the trier of fact's rejection of the
employer's asserted reasons for its actions mandates a finding for the
plaintiff.,,223 More precisely, the issue in Hicks was: if the plaintiff proved his
or her "prima facie case" of discrimination,224 and the plaintiff persuaded the trier
of fact that the employer's asserted reasons for its challenged action were false,
was the plaintiff therefore entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw? The Supreme
Court held that the answer was no.
The effect of Hicks on employment discrimination law has been addressed
in many scholarly articles,225 and this Article will not go over that ground again.
This Article will limit its discussion to various statements made in Hicks that
could be deemed relevant to the role that evidence of pretext should play in
determining whether the employer had an unlawful motivation for taking an
adverse action against an employee.
In employment discrimination law, after the plaintiff proves his or her prima
facie case of discrimination, a burden ofproduction (not persuasion) shifts to the
defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
employment action at issue.226 After the employer has met this burden of
production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the "legitimate

222. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
223. ld. at 504.
224. It is important to recognize that the elements of a "prima facie case" in
employment discrimination law are very diffl:!rent from the elements of the prima facie
case in the Wright Line analysis under the NLRA.
The elements of a prima facie case in employment discrimination vary depending
on the type of adverse employment action being challenged (e.g., discharge, failure to
hire), and on the federal circuit in which the claim is brought, but the elements can be
fairly summarized as follows: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class (e.g., the
plaintiff is a female, or a member of a minority group); (2) the plaintiff met the
qualifications of the position at issue; (3) the employer took an adverse employment
action against the plaintiff; and (4) the employer looked for a replacement for the
plaintiff, or for an applicant other than the plaintiff, to fill the position. See generally
Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703, 703 & nn.4-5, 729 & n.146, 731 & n.154
(1995) (discussing elements of prima facie case for different types of claims).
225. See generally Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment
after Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2235 n.28 (1995) (citing several of the articles
discussing Hicks).
226. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07.
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reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.,,227 The meaning of this standard for what the plaintiff was
required to prove was the central issue in Hicks. The dissent in Hicks, as well
as many lower courts, interpreted this standard as "mean[ing] that if the plaintiff
proves the asserted reason to be false, the plaintiff winS.'>228 The majority in
Hicks rejected that view, holding "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for
discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason."m Consistent with this position, the Hicks
majority declared that all references in past Supreme Court discrimination
decisions to the plaintiff proving "pretext" did not merely mean proving that the
employer's asserted reason was false, but that the employer's false reason was
a "coverup" for discrimination.23o
In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that evidence that the employer's asserted
reason for its action is pretextual is not sufficient to compel the factfinder to find
unlawful discrimination. The Court stressed:
We have no authority to impose liability upon an employer for alleged
discriminatory employment practices unless an appropriate factfmder
determines, according to proper procedures, that the employer has
unlawfully discriminated.... [N]othing in law would permit us to
substitute for the required fin9ing that the employer's action was the
product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much
lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not
believable.231
Later in its opinion, the Court reiterated, "That the employer's proffered reason
is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that

227. Texas Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981), quoted
in Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515.

228. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphasis added).
See also Dister v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) ("CA] plaintiff

may prevail upon a showing that the employer's given legitimate reason is unworthy of
credence...."); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893,895 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987) (if the plaintiff proves a prima facie case and "that it is
more likely than not that the employer did not act for its proffered reason" then that is
sufficient to grant summary judgment for the plaintiff); Tye v. Bd. ofEduc. of Polaris
Joint Vocational Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
10 (1987) (plaintiff who proves a prima facie case and that the employer's reasons for the
adverse action are false is entitled to summary judgment); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878,
881 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[A] plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination and who discredits the defendants' rebuttal should prevai1.").
229. Hicks, 509 U.s. at 515.
230. ld. at 515-16 & n.6.
231. Id.at5l4-l5.
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the plaintiff's proffered reason of race is correct. That remains a question for the
factfinder to answer, subject, of course, to appellate review...."232
In Hicks, the Supreme Court emphasized that a finding that the employer's
asserted explanation for its action is false should not be equated with the
conclusion that the employer's action must have been unlawfully motivated.
Whether this holding undermines those Board precedents in which the Board
relied exclusively, or primarily, on evidence of pretext to find that the employer

violated Section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA will be examined in Part V of this
Article.233

2. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 234
Reeves is another major employment discrimination decision, in which the
Supreme Court decided an issue that had been left unsettled by Hicks.23s After
Hicks established that evidence proving the plaintiffs prima facie case and
evidence the employer's reason was false did not compel a finding of unlawful
discrimination, the federal circuit courts divided over whether such evidence was
sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find unlawful discrimination.236 The
Supreme Court decided to resolve this dispute in Reeves.237
The Court held that evidence proving the plaintiffs prima facie case,
combined with evidence that could lead a reasonable trier of fact to disbelieve
the employer's reason for its action, could be sufficient as a matter of law to
sustain a finding of intentional discrimination.238 In summarizing its holding, the
Court stated, "Thus, a plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient

232. Id. at 524.
233. See infra notes 273-81, 351-57 and accompanying text.
234. 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
235. Unlike Hicks, Reeves did not involve a claim under Title VII, but rather a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). See Reeves, 120 S.
Ct. at 2103. Nonetheless, it is virtually certain that the Court's holding in Reeves extends
to Title VII as well as ADEA cases. The Court in Reeves fonnulated its decision as an
interpretation of the three-stage framework applied in Title VII cases, see id. at 2105-06,
and as an interpretation of its Title VII precedent in Hicks. Moreover, lower federal
courts have already begun applying Reeves to Title VII claims. See, e.g., Malacara v.
City of Madison, 224 F.3d 727, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2000); Feliciano de la Cruz v. EI
Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2000); Griffin v. Ambika
Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 297,306 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
236. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2104-05 (summarizing the division in the federal circuit
courts on this issue).
237. Id. at 21 03 (defining the question presented as whether evidence proving the
prima facie case and evidence of pretext was insufficient as a matter oflaw to support a
finding of discrimination).
238. Id. at 2108-09.
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evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.,,239
The Court based its conclusion on basic principles of evidence and
factfinding. The Court explained that "[p]roofthat the defendant's explanation
is unworthy of credence is simply one fonn of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.,,24o In a
statement reminiscent of the Board's Shattuck Denn 241 rationale for using
evidence of pretext to find discrimination,242 the Court declared, "In appropriate
circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
pmpose.,,243 The Court observed that "[s]uch an inference is consistent with the
general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a
party's dishonesty about a material fact as 'affirmative evidence of guilt.",244
The Court also pointed out that "once the employer's justification has been
eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation,
especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason
for its decision. ,,245
The Court then cautioned that, despite the probative value of evidence of
pretext, it would not always be sufficient to sustain a finding of discrimination.
The Court explained, "Certainly there will be instances where, although the
plaintiffhas established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to
reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the
action was discriminatory.,,246 The Court then specifically identified two
situations when evidence of pretext would be insufficient to support a finding of
discrimination: (1) when "the record conclusively revealed" that even though
the reason proffered by the employer was false, there was another nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's action;247 and (2) when "the plaintiff
created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue
and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no
discrimination had occurred.,,248

239. ld. at 2109.
240. ld. at 2108 (citations omitted).
241. See Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 131-40 (discussing the Board's reliance
on the Shattuck Denn rationale).
243. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000).
244. ld. (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992» (citing Wilson v.
United States, 162 U.S. 613, 620-21 (1896); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 278(2), at 133
(1. Chadwick rev. ed. 1979».
245. ld. at 2108-09.
246. ld. at 2109.
247.ld.
248. ld. (citations omitted).
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The Court made clear that these two examples did not exhaust the situations
in which evidence proving the prima facie case and evidence of pretext would
be insufficient to support a finding of discrimination. The Court explained that
whether such evidence permitted a finding of discrimination "in any particular
case will depend on a number of factors.,,249 According to the Court, such
factors included "the strength of the plaintiffs prima facie case, the probative
value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other

evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered
on [an employer's] motion for judgment as a matter oflaw.,,250
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize her position
that evidence of the prima facie case and evidence of pretext should usually be
sufficient to support a finding of discrimination. Justice Ginsburg stated, "1
write separately to note that it may be incumbent on the Court, in an appropriate
case, to define more precisely the circumstances in which plaintiffs will be
required to submit evidence beyond these two categories in order to survive a
motion for judgment as a matter oflaw.,,251 She then asserted, "1 anticipate that
such circumstances will be uncommon.,,252 To support her assertion, Justice
Ginsburg restated the Court's point that "it is a principle of evidence law that the
jmy is entitled to treat a party's dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of
culpability.,,253 Justice Ginsburg further elaborated on this point, explaining:
Under this commonsense principle, evidence suggesting that a
defendant accused of illegal discrimination has chosen to give a false
explanation for its actions gives rise to a rational inference that the
defendant could be masking its illegal motivation. Whether the
defendant was in fact motivated by discrimination is of course for the
fmder of fact to decide .... But the inference remains-unless it is
conclusively demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required
to credit on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, that
discrimination could not have been the defendant's true motivation.
If such conclusive demonstrations are (as 1 suspect) atypical, it follows
that the ultimate question of liability ordinarily should not be taken
from the jmy once the plaintiff has introduced the two categories of
evidence described above.254
Thus, Justice Ginsburg maintained that it is rational for a trier of fact to infer a
discriminatory motive based on evidence of pretext, and therefore, triers of fact

249.ld.
250. ld.
251. ld. at 2112.
252.ld.
253. ld.
254. ld. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

928

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

should ordinarily be pennitted to fInd discrimination based only on evidence
proving the prima facie case combined with evidence of pretext.
The Supreme Court's decision in Reeves is a strong endorsement of the
probative value of evidence of pretext in fInding discriminatory motivation.
Whether the Court's holding in Reeves is pertinent to pretext cases under the
NLRA depends on whether the role of the Board and its ALJs in Section 8(a) (3)
cases is fairly analogous to the role of triers of fact in employment discrimination
cases. Moreover, if Reeves is relevant to Section 8(a)(3) cases, then the Board
must deal with the same issue the Supreme Court provided guidance on, but did
not resolve, in Reeves-in what situations will evidence of pretext not be
sufficient to support a fInding of discrimination? The implications of Reeves for
the Board's reliance on pretext to fInd discrimination will be discussed in Part V.

3. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
Department ofLabor v. Greenwich Collieriei- ss
In Greenwich Collieries, the Supreme Court interpreted a key provision of

the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),2S6 the principal federal statute
governing practice and proceedings before federal administrative agencies,257
including the National Labor Relations Board.258 In the course of interpreting
the APA, the Court overruled one of its holdings in Transportation Management,
the decision in which the Court upheld the Wright Line analysis. 2s9 The Court
in Greenwich Collieries promptly provided assurances that the Board's Wright
Line analysis remained valid, but Greenwich Collieries' revisitation of
Transportation Management certainly bears examination, because it could affect
the Board's application of the Wright Line analysis.
The issue directly before the Court in Greenwich Collieries was the validity
of the Department of Labor's "true doubt" rule.260 Under the "true doubt" rule,
which the Department of Labor applied in adjudicating claims for benefIts under
the Black Lung BenefIts Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, when the evidence for and against the claimant's entitlement
to benefIts was equally balanced, the claimant won.261 In Greenwich Collieries,
the Supreme Court struck down the "true doubt" rule, holding that it violated
255. 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
256. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, -701-706, 1305,3105,3344,5362, 7521 (1994).
257. See BLACK'S LAWDICfIONARY 46 (6th ed. 1990) (defining APA).
258. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
259. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
260. See Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 269.
261. ld.; see also Allan W. Brown, Note, Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries:
The End of the True Doubt Rule, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 1053, 1056-57 (1995); Jeffrey
Thomas Skinner, Note, Resolving the Doubt About the True Doubt Rule in Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 73 N.C. L. REv.
1299, 1306-08 (1995) (discussing the history and meaning of the ''true doubt" rule).
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Section 7(c) of the APA, which provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof."262
The Court devoted most of its opinion in Greenwich Collieries to
detennining the meaning of the phrase "burden of proof' in Section 7(c) of the
APA.263 Specifically, the Court considered whether the phrase meant the burden
ofpersuasion as to the ultimate fact in dispute, or merely, as the Department of
Labor contended, "the burden of production (i.e., the burden of going forward
with evidence).,,264 The Court decided that "burden of proof' in Section 7(c)
meant the burden of persuasion, and that this in turn meant that in cases where
the evidence was evenly balanced, the claimant had failed to sustain the ''burden
of proof' and so must lose. Thus, the "true doubt" rule, which provided that the
claimant won when the evidence was evenly balanced, was therefore inconsistent
with Section 7(c) of the APA, and therefore was invalid.uS
In finding that "burden of proof' in Section 7(c) meant the burden of
persuasion, the Court in Greenwich Collieries had to overrule a statement to the
contrary in Transportation Management. The Court explained that in
Transportation Management, the employer had argued that the Board's Wright
Line analysis "violated Section 7(c)'s burden of proof provision, which the
employer read as imposing the burden of persuasion on the employee.,,266 The
Court observed that "[i]n a footnote, we summarily rejected this argument,
concluding that '[ Section 7(c)] ... determines only the burden of going forward,
not the burden of persuasion.",267 The Court then declared, "we do not think our
cursory conclusion in the Transportation Management footnote withstands
scrutiny ... Transportation Management's cursory answer to an ancillary and
largely unbriefed question does not warrant the same level of deference we
typically give our precedents.,,268
A few paragraphs later, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Transportation
Management, explaining that it was consistent with the Court's new construction
of Section 7(c) of the APA:
[A]lthough we reject Transportation Management's reading of § 7(c),
the holding in that case remains intact. The NLRB's approach in
Transportation Management is consistent with § 7(c) because the
NLRB first required the employee to persuade it that antiunion
sentiment contributed to the employer's decision. Only then did the

262. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994), quoted in Dir., Office of Workers' Compo
Programs, Dep't of Labor V. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 269 (1994).
263. See Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 272-81.
264. ld. at 272.
265. See id. at 281.
266. ld. at 277.
267. ld. (quoting NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 n.7 (1983».
268. ld.
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NLRB place the burden of persuasion on the employer as to its
affirmative defense. 269
Thus, the Supreme Court in Greenwich Collieries interpreted Section 7(c)
of the APA as meaning that the "proponent of a rule" bears the burden of
persuasion. In a discrimination case under Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, the
"proponent of the rule" for purposes of Section 7(c) is the Board, or, more
specifically, the General Counse1. 270 In Greenwich Collieries, the Supreme
Court held that the Wright Line analysis was consistent with the Court's new
reading of Section 7(c), because under Wright Line, the General Counsel does
bear the requisite burden of proving that "antiunion sentiment contributed to the
employer's decision.,,271 Whether the Board has consistently required the
General Counsel to truly meet this burden in cases involving evidence of pretext,
and accordingly whether the Board has consistently adhered to Greenwich
Collieries' new construction of Section 7(c), will be discussed in Part V. 272

C. The Board's and Courts' Application o/Hicks and
Greenwich Collieries to Section 8(a)(3) Cases
The Board and the federal courts of appeals have acknowledged that
Supreme Court precedents under the APA and federal discrimination statutes are
relevant to the Board's approach to discrimination cases. The Supreme Court's
decision in Reeves was issued in June 2000, and the Board and the courts to date
have not yet considered its effect on Section 8(a)(3) cases. The Board and some
courts have, however, discussed the implications of both Hicks and Greeenwich
Collieries for Section 8(a)(3) cases.
One particularly notable example is the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Southwest Merchandising Corp. v. NLRB,273 in which the court extensively
discussed how Hicks arid Greenwich Collieries may affect the Board's handling
of Section 8(a)(3) cases. In Southwest Merchandising, the D.C. Circuit upheld
the Board's ruling that the employer, a grocery store chain, had violated Section
8(a)(3) when, after it purchased a bankrupt grocery store chain, it refused to hire
former employees of the purchasee who had engaged in a strike against the
purchasee the year before it went out ofbusiness. 274
The court began its analysis by setting forth the Wright Line standard. The
court then noted that the Supreme Court had upheld the Wright Line test in

269. ld. at 278.
270. See Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 404 n.7.
271. Dir., Office of Workers' Compo Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 278 (1994).
272. See infra text accompanying notes 325-30.
273. 53 F.3d 1334 (1995).
274. See id. at 1336-38 (discussing the facts of the case).
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Transportation Management, but then in Greenwich Collieries the Court had
overruled the portion of Transportation Management construing Section 7(c) of
the APA.27S The D.C. Circuit pointed out that in Greenwich Collieries, the
Supreme Court had "concluded that the Board's Wright Line test was
pennissible because it does no more than impose the burden of proving an
affinnative defense on the employer.,,276
The D.C. Circuit then set forth its interpretation of how the Wright Line
analysis should be applied after Greenwich Collieries:
Reading Greenwich Collieries and Wright Line together, then, the
General Counsel bears the burden of demonstrating that the employer

acted with discriminatory motive throughout the case. Although the
Board labels the General Counsel's burden that of establishing a
'prima facie' case, it has, in fact, traditionally required the General
Counsel to sustain the burden of proving that the employer was
motivated by antiunion animuS.277

In a footnote, the D.C. Circuit asserted, as the Second Circuit had in Holo-Krome
III, that the term "prima facie case" should not be used in applying the Wright
Line test: "Presumably, in the wake of Greenwich Collieries, it will no longer
be appropriate to term the General Counsel's burden that of mounting a prima
facie case; his burden is to persuade the Board that the employer acted out of
antiunion animus. ,,278
Although the court faulted the use of the phrase "prima facie case" to refer
to the first stage of the Wright Line test, the court reaffinned that the General
Counsel could use evidence of pretext to meet its burden at that stage. The D.C.
Circuit held:
The General Counsel may, of course, use the employer's own
response to the charges as part of his evidence of antiunion animus.
As the Board explained in Wright Line, 'the absence of any legitimate
basis for an action'-i.e., the absence ofa credible explanation from
the employer-'may form part of the proof of the General Counsel's
case.,279
The court explained that in Wright Line, the Board based its principle on the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Shattuck Denn that a finding that "the stated motive for

275. See id. at 1339-40.
276. ld. at 1340.
277. ld.
278. ld. at 1340 n.8.
279. ld. at 1340 (quoting Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 n.l2 (1980),
enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981».
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a discharge is false" permits the factfinder to infer that the true motive is an
unlawful one. 280
The D.C. Circuit suggested that this reliance on evidence of pretext was
also consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks. After discussing
Shattuck Denn, the D.C. Circuit mentioned that in a prior employment
discrimination case, it had interpreted Hicks as meaning that "[u]nder the Title
VII framework, 'a factfinder's rejection of the employer's nondiscriminatory
reasons, while not sufficient to compel a finding of discrimination, nonetheless
suffices to penn it such a finding. ",281 Thus, in Southwest Merchandising, the
D.C. Circuit ruled that the Board's policy of allowing the General Counsel to use
evidence of pretext to meet its burden at the first stage of the Wright Line
analysis was consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in both Hicks and

Greenwich Collieries.
The D.C. Circuit reaffinned that position in 1997 in Schaeff, Inc. v.
NLRB.282 In Schaeff, both the employer and the Board offered arguments on the
meaning of Greenwich Collieries. The employer argued that, "unlike the
Supreme Court's earlier interpretation of Wright Line, Greenwich Collieries
places the burden of persuasion on the General Counsel at all times," while the
Board claimed that "Greenwich Collieries reaffinns the Wright Line test.,,283
The D.C. Circuit explained that there was no inconsistency between these two
arguments:
Both are correct. Greenwich Collieries does hold that the ultimate
burden of persuasion remains with the General Counsel. It thus

overrules the portion of NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.
holding that the General Counsel has only the burden of going forward
with evidence of discrimination and does not retain the burden of
persuasion throughout the proceeding. But the Court added that, once
the General Counsel establishes that anti-union animus was a
motivating factor, the employer bears the burden of establishing any
affirmative defense such as the inevitability of termination. 284
The D.C. Circuit then reiterated Southwest Merchandising's point that "[t]he
practical effect of Greenwich Collieries thus may be no more than the
abandonment of the term 'prima facie case' to describe the General Counsel's

280. ld. (quoting Shattuck Denn Mining Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir.
1966».
281. ld. (quoting Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995». The
D.C. Circuit's construction of Hicks has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000).
282. 113 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
283. ld. at 266 n.s.
284. ld. at 267 (citations omitted).
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burden. n28s The court went on to uphold the Board's finding of Section 8(a)(3)
violations by Schaeff.286
The Board has discussed the recommendation made by the D.C. Circuit and
other courts287 that it stop using the teon "prima facie" in describing the first
stage of the Wright Line process. In 1996, in Manno Electric, Inc.,288 the Board
noted that in Southwest Merchandising, "[t]he D.C. Circuit has suggested that
in light of [Greenwich Collieries] ... 'it will no longer be appropriate to teon the
General Counsel's burden that of mounting a prima facie case; his burden is to
persuade the Board that the employer acted out of antiunion animus. ",289 The
Board referred to this as a "change in phraseology" and asserted that it "does not
represent a substantive change in the Wright Line test" because "[u]nder that test,
the Board has always first required the General Counsel to persuade that
antiunion sentiment was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged
employer decision.,,290
Although the Board downplayed the significance of the phrase "prima facie
case" in Manno Electric, in a subsequent decision the Board made a point of
correcting an ALJ who stated that the Board deemed the phrase inappropriate.
In The 3E Company, Inc.,291 the Board noted that the ALJ had quoted the Board
as stating in Manno Electric that it would no longer be appropriate to refer to the
General Counsel's burden as the prima facie case. The Board explained this was
erroneous: "We note, however, that the Board in that case actually was quoting
from the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in Southwest Merchandising Corp. v.
NLRB, suggesting that the Board take this approach in light of [GreenWich
Collieries]."292 Moreover, even since its decision in Manno Electric, the Board
has continued to use the phrase "prima facie case" to refer to the General

285. ld. (citing Southwest Merch. Corp. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1334, 1339-40 & n.8
(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
286. Relying on Schaeff, the Seventh Circuit also reasoned in NLRB v. Joy
Recovery Technology Corp., 134 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir. 1998), that Greenwich Collieries
involves only "a modest refinement or clarification of the Wright Line standard." The
Seventh Circuit, echoing the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, explained that Greenwich
Collieries "makes clear that the [Wright Line] analysis does not simply require General
Counsel to establish a prima facie case. General Counsel must establish that antiunion
animus was a motivating factor in the decision." ld. at 1314.
287. See supra notes 171,214 and accompanying text (discussing the Second and
Fourth Circuits' criticism of the phrase "prima facie case").
288. 321 N.L.R.B. 278 (1996).
289. ld. at 299 n.12 (citations omitted).
290. ld.; see also Rose Hills Mortuary L.P., 324 N.L.R.B. 406, 406 n.4 (1997),
enforced, 203 F.3d 832 (9tli. Cir. 1999) (relying on its decision in Manno Electric to
explain that ''the judge's use of the term 'prima facie burden' in describing the General

Counsel's burden ... does not substantively affect her analysis or conclusions").
291. 322 N.L.R.B. 1058 (1997), enforced, 132 F.3d 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

292. ld. at 1063 n.1 (citations omitted).
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Counsel's burden at the first stage of the Wright Line analysis.293 Thus, while the
Board has acknowledged the D.C. Circuit's recommendation that it stop using
the phrase "prima facie case," the Board has not adopted this recommendation.
The Board's indirect references to Greenwich Collieries in its decisions in
Manno Electric and The 3E Company are the closest the Board has come to
discussing the possible impact of the Greenwich Collieries decision on the
Wright Line analysis. The Board appeared to pay closer attention to the Supreme
Court's decision in Hicks, in the Precision Industries case. As mentioned in Part
III/94 in Precision Industries the Board disavowed ALJ Thomas Wilks's
assertion that he could rely on a finding of pretext, rather than the full Wright
Line analysis, as an alternative means of detennining that the employer had
violated Section 8(a)(3). In so doing, the Board referred to Hicks.
The Board in Precision Industries adopted ALJ Wilks's conclusion that the

employer had violated Section 8(a)(3) because its motivation for adopting a
combination of preemployment screening devices at its Malvern, Arkansas plant
was to keep from hiring a majority of its labor force for this plant from the
former employees of its unionized predecessor.295 But the Board then stated, "In
affirming the judge's findings, however, we disavow his implication that,
disregarding other evidence of unlawful motivation, he was constrained to find
a violation of Section 8(a)(3) solely because he did not believe the testimony of
the Respondent's witnesses concerning the reasons for implementing the
screening processes at Malvern.,,296
The Board explained that the ALJ's finding that the employer's
explanations were pretextual entitled the ALJ to "infer that there was another
reason," but it did not compel the conclusion that "the real reason was grounded
in antiunion animuS.,,297 The Board observed that the employer's pretextual
explanations "might have been offered in an attempt to conceal a violation of
some other statute instead of the NLRA, or a motive that may have been base but
not unlawful at all.,,298 The Board then cited Hicks for the proposition that "[i]n
[aJ Title VII case, [the] trier offact's rejection of defendant's proffered reasons
permits, but does not compel, finding of intentional discrimination.,,299 Thus, the
Board relied on Hicks as supporting (if not mandating) the distinction the Board

293. See, e.g., Zeppelin Elec. Co., 328 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (1999); Gen. Sec. Servs.
Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (1998); MJ. Mech. Servs., Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 812, 816
(1997); Triple H Elec. Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 549, 549 n.2 (1997); C.R. Gen., Inc., 323
N.L.R.B. 494, 494 n.I (1997).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
295. See Pace Indus., Inc. (Precision Indus.), 320 N.L.R.B. 661, 661 (1996),
enforced, 118 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 1997).
296.
297.
298.
299.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 661 n.4 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993».
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drew between evidence that permits a fmding of unlawful motivation, and
evidence that compels such a finding.
The Board next distinguished Shattuck Denn and Williams Contracting,
Inc.,3°O on which ALJ Wilks had relied. The Board maintained, contrary to ALJ
Wilks, that these two decisions supported the Board's position that evidence of
pretext did not compel the finding of illegal motiviation.
Both the court in Shattuck Denn and the Board in Williams inferred
unlawful motive from explanations found to be pretextual, but not

from the pretextual explanations alone; other evidence of unlawful
motive existed as well. And both the court and the Board found that
the inference of unlawful discrimination was permissible, not
compelled.3ot

In accordance with the distinction between findings of pretext "permitting" or
"compelling" findings of unlawful motivation, the Board declared that disbelief
of the employer's explanation does not "'necessarily compel' the conclusion that
the Respondent's true motive ... was discriminatory within the meaning of the
Act.,,302
Although the Board overruled ALJ Wilks's statement that pretext
compelled a finding of unlawful motive, the Board affirmed the ALJ's finding
of such a motive, explaining that it was permissible to base such a finding largely
on evidence ofpretexe03 The Board also rejected the employer's arguments that
the AU, by assessing the employer's explanations at the prima facie stage of the
analysis, had in effect required the employer "to prove, in the prima facie stage
of analysis, that it had a sufficient business justification for its actions" or "to
disprove the existence of antiunion animUS.,,304 Relying on decisions previously
discussed in this Article, the Board held that it had been appropriate for the ALJ
to consider the employer's explanations in ruling on whether the General
Counsel had proved its prima facie case: "The judge properly considered all the
relevant record evidence, including the Respondent's witnesses' discredited
testimony, in finding that the General Counsel had proved that the Respondent
acted from unlawful motives.,,30S
In sum, in Precision Industries, the Board reaffirmed that evidence that the
employer's proffered reasons for its challenged action are pretextual can be

300. 309 N.L.R.B. 433 (1992).
301. Pace Indus., Inc. (Precision Indus.), 320 N.L.R.B. 661, 661 n.4 (1996),
enforced, 118 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 1997).
302. [d. at 661.
303. [d. at 661-62.
304. [d. at 662 n.7.
305. [d. (citing Greco & Haines, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 634 (1992); Union-Tribune
Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1993); Wright Line, 251 N.L.RB. 1083, 1088
n.l2 (1980); Shattuck Denn Mining Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466,470 (9th Cir. 1966».
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considered in detennining whether the General Counsel has proven its prima
facie case. But, the Board also announced that a fmding that the employer's
reasons are pretextual does not compel a finding of unlawful motivation. Since
Precision· Industries, the Board has not expressly addressed the related issue of
whether such evidence of pretext would be sufficient, by itself, to permit a
fmding of unlawful motivation. Notably, in Board decisions issued since
Precision Industries, the Board has continued to affirm ALJ decisions in which
the ALJ relied substantially on evidence of pretext in detennining that the

General Counsel had proven its prima facie case.306 The validity of the Board's
reliance on pretext will be examined in Part V, in the context of an overall
analysis of the Board's approach to the problem of pretext.

V. HAs THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD GONE WRONG?:
ASSESSING ITS APPROACH TO PRETEXT CASES

Within the past decade, the Board's approach to pretext cases has become
fairly well-settled. Since its 1992 decision in Greco & Haines, the Board has
maintained the position that it can consider the evidence the employer offers in
its defense in detennining whether the General Counsel has met its prima facie
case. Thus, where the evidence of pretext derives from evidence the employer
has presented in its defense of the case, the Board will consider that evidence
even at the fIrst stage of the Wright Line process.
In many cases in the 1990s, the Board has relied substantially, or even
solely, on evidence of pretext in concluding that the employer was at least'
partially motivated by antiunion animus in taking the employment action at
issue. In 1996, in Precision Industries, the Board announced that a finding that
the employer's reasons are pretextual does not compel a finding of unlawful
motivation. However, the Board implied in Precision Industries that evidence
of pretext could permit a finding of unlawful motivation. Furthermore, the
Board's affirmation of ALJ decisions since Precision Industries confirms that
the Board's view is that evidence of pretext is sufficient to support the
conclusion that an employer's action against a union supporter was unlawfully
motivated.
Thus, the Board seems to have resolved its position on the correct approach
to pretext cases. It is by no means clear, however, that the Board's position is
legally permissible. The Board's resolution of the issues discussed above has

306. See, e.g., Johnson Distrib., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1221-24 (1997) (relying
on shifting and pretextual reasons for tennination to find prima facie case was satisfied);
Power Sys. Analysis, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 511, 514-15 (1996) (relying on "evidence of
false reasons and concealment" to infer union animus); 87-10 51 st Ave. Owners Corp.,
320 N.L.R.B. 993, 998 (1996) (relying on the "obvious pretextual basis of the reason
proffered by the [employer]" for the discharge of three employees to find that the General
Counsel proved its prima facie case that these discharges were unlawful).
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received a mixed reception in the federal courts of appeals. Even where courts
have generally accepted the Board's approach to pretext cases, they have
recommended limitations on the Board's reliance on evidence of pretext to find
unlawful motivation. In light of these judicial critiques of the Board's approach
to pretext cases, this Article will now evaluate the validity of that approach.

A. Should the National Labor Relations Board Consider
, Evidence ofPretext at the First Stage of the
Wright Line Analysis?
As discussed earlier, there has been considerable contention in the Board
and in the federal courts of appeals over whether the Board and its ALJs, in
assessing whether the General Counsel has met its first stage burden, are
permitted to even consider the evidence offered by the employer for its action,
much less to rely heavily on findings that such evidence is pretextual in deciding
that the General Counsel has established its first stage burden of proof. Thus, the
threshold question in examining the Board's approach to pretext cases is whether
the Board was correct in its 1992 decision in Greco & Haines in ruling that the
"entire record," including the employer's evidence, could be considered in
assessing the General Counsel's case. If Greco & Haines was wrongly decided,

then the Board would have to alter its approach to pretext cases in a way that
would greatly diminish the role of evidence of pretext in proving Section 8(a)(3)
violations.
Assessment of the validity of Greco & Haines must begin with a review of
the fundamentals of Section 8(a) (3) law. As discussed in Part I, it is well
established that the central issue in virtually all Section 8(a)(3) cases is the
employer's motivation for taking an adverse action against the employee.307 It
is also well established that motive in general, and the motivation of an employer
in Section 8(a)(3) cases in particular, is a question offact.308 Thus, the Board,
and its ALJs, act as triers of fact in determining whether an employer had an
unlawful antiunion motive for taking an action against an employee.309 The
courts have recognized that in making this factual determination, the Board can
rely on circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence.31O More specifically,
courts have held that the Board can draw inferences of unlawful motive based

307. See supra note 6.
308. See. e.g., Concepts &D~igns, Inc. v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 1243, 1244 (8th Cir.

1996); Laro Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 224, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1995); NLRB v. MiniTogs, Inc., 980 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1993); NLRB v. Rich's Precision Foundry, Inc., 667
F.2d 613,626 (7th Cir. 1981).
309. See generally Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160
(1994), which refers in several places to the Board's making findings of fact in unfair
labor practice cases.
310. See, e.g., Mini-Togs, 980 F.2d at 1032; Rich's Precision Foundry, 667 F.2d
at 626.
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on circumstantial evidence.311 In basing findings of unlawful motive on evidence
of pretext, the Board, in its capacity as trier offact, is exercising its authority to
infer unlawful motive from circumstantial evidence.
In acting as trier of fact, the Board must be cognizant of which party bears
the burden of proof on relevant issues. Under the Wright Line standard, and
under Section 10(c) of the NLRA, the General Counsel bears the burden of
proving that an employer's antiunion sentiment was a motivating factor in the
employer's challenged decision. Given that the Board can rely on circumstantial
evidence in determining motive, it is clear that if the General Counsel presented
evidence that the employer's stated reasons for its challenged decision were
pretextual, the Board could consider that evidence in deciding whether the
General Counsel had proven unlawful motive. But the question raised by Greco
& Haines is: Is it proper for the Board to consider evidence presented by the
employer in deciding whether the General Counsel proved unlawful motive?
In several cases, employers have strongly contended that this is improper.
Employers have argued that Wright Line dictates a particular order of events at
the hearing: that only after the ALJ has deemed the General Counsel's prima
facie case sufficient is the employer even required to bring fOlWard evidence of
its reason.312 In making this argument, employers are in effect claiming that they
have a right to have the adequacy of the General Counsel's prima facie case
assessed based solely on the evidence presented by the General Counsel.
In Greco & Haines and its progeny, the Board has implicitly rejected the
existence of such a right. The employers' theory has been more explicitly
rejected by ALJ Richard J. Linton, in a series of decisions adopted by the Board.
ALJ Linton has directly declared that employers cannot require ALJs or the
Board to evaluate the General Counsel's "prima facie" case based solely on the
evidence presented by the General Counsel, unless the employer desists from
presenting any evidence in its own defense. For example, in Kidd Electric
CO.,313 ALJ Linton explained that after the employer moved for dismissal of the
Section 8(a)(3) allegation at the close of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, and
the ALJ denied that motion:

At that point [the employer] was faced with making an election: it
could rest on its motion, or it could proceed with its case-in-chief. It
could not eat its cake and keep it too. A respondent or defendant tests
the sufficiency of its motion to dismiss by resting on it. If a

311. See Concepts & Designs, 101 F.3d at 1244 ("Motivation is a question offact
that may be inferred from both direct and circumstantial evidence."); Laro Maint., 56
F.3d at 229 ("Motive is a question of fact that may be inferred from direct or
circumstantial evidence .... Drawing such inferences from the evidence to assess an
employer's hiring motive invokes the expertise of the Board ....").
312. See, e.g., Union-Tribune Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 486,490 (7th Cir.
1993).
313. 313 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1994).
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respondent or defendant, rather than resting on its motion, proceeds
with its own case-in-chief, then it waives its motion to dismiss and the
trier of fact weighs all the evidence in the entire record in reaching a
decision on the merits.314
As ALJ Linton has explained, the practical import of Greco & Haines for
employers is that the only way they can stop the Board from considering their
evidence when assessing the General Counsel's case is by not giving the Board
any evidence to consider. That is, they must refrain from presenting any
evidence, and thus leave the General Counsel's evidence as the only evidence
in the record. Understandably, most employers have not chosen this option
when defending Section 8(a)(3) charges.

Instead, many employers have maintained that (to borrow AU Linton's
phrase) they do have a right to eat their cake and keep it, too. Their view is that
whatever evidence is in the record, and at whatever point the ALJ and the Board
are considering that evidence, the ALJ and the Board should assess the prima
facie case based only on the evidence presented by the General Counsel. In the
early 1990s, employers succeeded in convincing the courts of appeals that their
view was correct.31S However, the current trend is for courts of appeals to
disagree with the employers' argument, and to accept the Board's Greco &
Haines position that the "entire record" can be considered in assessing the prima
facie case. Employers are still pressing the issue, however, and it is certainly
possible that employers will convince one or more of the many circuit courts that
have not yet considered the issue that the Board's approach is invalid.316
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to analyze thoroughly who is correct-employers
or the Board.
First, it should be considered whether the Board's Greco & Haines
approach violates any governing legal authority, such as prior precedents in
Section 8(a)(3) cases or relevant statutes. Employers, and some courts of

314. ld. at 1187 (1994)(citations omitted); see also Peter Vitalie Co., 313 N .L.R.B.
971,972 (1994) (ALI Linton recounts that he told the employer's representative, after
denying their motion that the case should be dismissed because the General Counsel had
failed to present sufficient evidence of a prima facie case, that if the employer proceeded
with presenting its defense then the employer ''would be deemed to have waived its
motion to dismiss, and in reaching my decision I would consider not simply the evidence
as of [the employer's] motion, but the entire record."); Formosa Plastics Corp., 320
N.L.R.B. 631, 642 (1996) (ALI Linton applies the same ''waiver'' rule in the context of
non-Section 8(a) (3) unfair labor practices).
315. See, e.g., Goldtex, Inc., 14 F.3d 1008, 1012 (4th Cir. 1994); Vemco, Inc., 989
F.2d 1468, 1477 (6th Cir. 1993); Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB (Holo-Krome II), 947 F.2d
588 (2d Cir. 1991).
316. The circuits that have not yet considered the issue are the First, Third, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See supra Part IV.A. (discussing decisions by the
circuits that have considered the issue).
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appeals, have contended that Wright Line itself dictates that the General Counsel
has to prove its prima facie case before the employer need even present its
evidence.317 It is true that in some portions of Wright Line, the Board referred
to the General Counsel's showing of a prima facie case as occurring before the
burden shifts to the employer to prove its defense.318 Throughout the decision,
however, the Board made statements that demonstrate that the two-stage
sequence established in Wright Line occurs not when the evidence is being
presented, but when the Board is making its decision.
The first place in Wright Line where the Board indicated that the two-stage
sequence occurs at the time of decision was during its discussion of the Mt.
Healthy decision, on which it based the Wright Line standard. In Wright Line,
the Board quotes a passage from Mt. Healthy that shows that the two stages both
occur as the court is making its decision. The passage states that after the
plaintiff in Mt. 'Healthy met his first stage burden, "the District Court should
have gone on to detennine whether the [School] Board had shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision.
• • •"319 Notably, this passage does not state that after the first stage is completed,
that the court should then hear evidence regarding the second stage. Rather, it
is implicit in the Mt. Healthy standard that all of the evidence is before the court
as it applies the two-stage analysis. Thus, in the Mt. Healthy standard that serves
as the source of the Wright Line test, the two-stage analysis occurs at the point
of decision.
Other parts of the Wright Line decision make it even clearer that it is at the
point of decision, not during the course of the hearing, that the two stages occur.
In asserting that its new Wright Line standard was consistent with its historical
approach to Section 8(a)(3) cases, the Board stated that "the Board's decisional
process traditionally has involved" a two-stage inquiry.320 Significantly, it is at
this point that the Board dropped the footnote, footnote twelve, in which it relied

317. See Goldtex, 14 F.3d at 1012 (referring to Wright Line's and Transportation
Management's ''burden of proof allocations" to support its conclusion that evidence

regarding the employer's reason for the challenged action was "premature" at the prima
facie stage).
318. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087 (1980) ("[I]t is made abundantly
clear in Mt. Healthy . .. that after an employee or, here, the General Counsel makes out
a prima facie case of employer reliance upon protected activity, the burden shifts to the
employer to demonstrate that the decision would have been the same in the absence of
protected activity."); ld. at 1089 (emphases added) ("First, we shall require that the
General Counsel make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that
protected conduct was a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision. Once this is
established, the burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same action
would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.").
319.ld. (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
287 (1977».
320. ld. at 1088 (emphasis added).
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on Shattuck Denn to support the proposition that the lack of a legitimate reason
for the employer's action may form part of the proof of the General Counsel's
case. In the crucial part of the decision, when the Board summed up what it had
done in Wright Line, the Board explained that its new two-stage analysis would
"provide the necessary clarification of our decisional processes... .'>321 The
Board in Wright Line thus envisioned that its new two-stage test would guide the
process of analysis of decisionmakers, namely ALJs and the Board itself, not that
it would dictate the conduct oflitigation.322
The Transportation Management decision also does not bar decisionmakers
from considering evidence presented by the employer in assessing the prima
facie stage of the Wright Line process. In fact, the Supreme Court completely
left out of its Transportation Management decision any indication that the events
in the Wright Line process should occur in any particular order. In its description
of the Wright Line standard, the Court even left out the "sequential" terms that
the Board used in portions of Wright Line, such as "first" and "after.,,323 The
Court in Transportation Management consistently described the standard in
terms of what each side had to prove, without limiting in any way the evidence
the parties could use to meet their proofs.324 Perhaps most illustrative was the
Supreme Court's approach in applying the Wright Line analysis to the facts of

321. ld. at 1089 (emphasis added).
322. The Board did emphasize in Wright Line that in deciding Section 8(a)(3)
cases, it would go through a sequential process, in which it would assess the General
Counsel's case first, and then consider the employer's defense. See id. (emphasis added).
This sequential process is undermined by the Fourth Circuit's rulings, in Medeco and
CWI, that evidence supporting the employer's asserted reason can "negate" the General
Counsel's prima facie case. See Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. NLRB, 142 F.3d 733, 742
(4th Cir. 1998); NLRB v. CWI of Maryland, Inc., 127 F.3d 319, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Fourth Circuit's approach calls for the Board to determine, at the first stage, whether
the evidence supporting the employer's proffered reason is so strong that it proves that
this reason was the predominant motive for the employer's action. This, of course, is the
determination that Wright Line saves for the second stage of the decisionmaking process.
The Fourth Circuit's approach conflates the two stages.
More importantly, the Fourth Circuit's approach affects the burden that is placed
on the General Counsel at the first stage. If, as the Fourth Circuit has stated, ''the
presence of a legitimate explanation may work to negate the General Counsel's case,"
then the General Counsel, to avoid having its case negated, must prove that this
legitimate reason was not the predominant motive for the employer's action. CWI,127
F.3d at 332. This was exactly the same obligation that the First Circuit placed on the
General Counsel in its decision in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S.
393, 395 (1983), and that the Supreme Court overturned. In sum, the Fourth Circuit's
approach conflicts with both Wright Line and Transportation Management, and therefore

is invalid.
323. See Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 395 (describing Wright Line standard).
324. See id. at 400-01 (discussing "elements" that the General Counsel and
employer must prove in the Wright Line process).
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Transportation Management itself. In affinning that the Board was justified in
fmding a Section 8(a) (3) violation, the Court relied heavily on evidence
regarding the employer's reasons for its actions (i.e., weakness of the reason
given, departure from.usual practices) without finding it necessary to examine
from which side that evidence came. Thus, Transportation Management
actually supports the Board's position that it can consider evidence presented by
the employer in deciding whether the General Counsel has proven its prima facie
case.
The statutes that regulate burdens of proof in unfair labor practice cases also
do not preclude the approach adopted by the Board in Greco & Haines. In
Greenwich Collieries, the Supreme Court reaffinned that the Board is bound by
the APA when adjudicating unfair labor practice cases. But review of the APA
reveals that the statute does not conflict with the Board's Greco & Haines

approach. Section 7(c) of the APA provides that "a proponent of a rule or order
has the burden ofproof.,,325 As discussed in Part N, the Supreme Court held in
1994 in Greenwich Collieries that ''burden of proof' in Section 7(c) of the APA
meant burden of persuasion.326 Section 7(c) does not mandate that the agency
decisionmaker must consider only evidence presented by the "proponent of the
rule" in deciding whether that party has met its burden. The only limitation
Section 7(c) of the APA imposes on the agency's use of evidence is that the
agency "shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious evidence.,,327
Moreover, in Greenwich Collieries, the Supreme Court never indicated that
the burden of persuasion must be satisfied by evidence introduced by the
proponent of the rule. The Court defined burden of persuasion as "the notion
that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of
persuasion must 10se.,,328 The Court returned to that definition in its holding,
stating "Under § 7(c) ... when the evidence is evenly balanced, the benefits
claimant must lose.,,329 The Court never discussed from which side that
"evidence" must come.
The other statute that the Board must comply with in adjudicating cases is,
of course, the NLRA. Section 10 of the NLRA prescribes the procedures the
Board must follow in deciding cases. Section 1O(c) of the NLRA does require
that unfair labor practices be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, but it
does not state that only evidence presented by the General Counsel can be used
to satisfy that burden. Indeed, in defining the burden of proof, Section 10(c)

325. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994).
326. See Dir., Office of Workers' Compo Programs, Dep't of Labor V. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 276 (1994); supra Part IV.A.3. (discussing Greenwich
Collieries decision).
327. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994).

328. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 272.
329. ld. at 281.
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twice uses the phrase ''the preponderance of the testimony taken. ,,330 The phrase
"testimony taken" is clearly broad enough to encompass the testimony and other
evidence presented by the employer along with the evidence presented by the

General Counsel. Hence, the language of Section lO(c) pennits the Board to
consider evidence produced by the employer in deciding whether the General
Counsel has met its burden of proof.
Another relevant provision in Section 10 of the NLRA is Section IO(b).
Section 10(b) states that unfair labor practice proceedings "shall, so far as
practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in
the district courts of the United States.,,331 This makes it pertinent to consider
whether the Board's Greco & Haines position is consistent with evidentiary and
procedural rules that apply in federal civil cases.
In fact, Greco & Haines is consistent with key doctrines of evidence and
procedure. A general tenet of federal evidence law is that:
In detennining whether any fact in issue has been proved by a
preponderance of evidence in the case, the jury may, unless otherwise
instructed, consider the testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who
may have called them, and all exhibits received in evidence, regardless
of who may have produced them.332

Juries are often given this rule as an instruction.333 Moreover, where judges act
as triers of fact, they also follow this principle.334 Accordingly, under this
doctrine, in ruling on the factual issue of whether antiunion sentiment was a
motivating factor in the decision, the Board could consider testimony and other
evidence offered by the employer, even though the General Counsel bears the
burden of proof on the issue.
The Greco & Haines approach also conforms with the federal rules of civil
procedure. Federal Ru1e of Civil Procedure 52 addresses findings of fact by a
court. Rule 52(c) provides:

330. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
331. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1994).
332. 3 HaN. EDWARD J. DEVITI ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 72.01 (4th ed. 1987) (emphasis added); see also Harvey v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 873 F.2d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1989) (invoking this rule).
333. See Lindsey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 757 F. Supp. 888, 891 (N.D. Ill.
1991) ("[J]uries are regularly instructed that they may consider all testimony (regardless
of who may have called any witness) and all exhibits (regardless of who may have
introduced them)."), ajJ'd in relevant part, 962 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1992).
334. See, e.g., Merzon v. County of Suffolk, 767 F. Supp. 432, 445 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (emphasis added) ("In determining whether any fact in issue has been proved by

a preponderance of the evidence in the case, the Court may consider and weigh the
testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have caIIed them, and ail exhibits
received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them.").
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If during a trial without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue
and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter
judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim
or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or
defeated without a favorable finding on that issue, or the court may
decline to render any judgment until the close ofall the evidence.33S
In an unfair labor practice case, the Board and, earlier in the process, an ALJ,
assumes the role played by a trial judge in a trial without a jury. In a Section
8(a)(3) case, after the General Counsel has presented all its evidence on the issue
whether antiunion animus was a motivating factor for the employer, and the
General Counsel has thus "been fully heard" on that issue, Rule 52(c) would
permit the Board to rule against the General Counsel at that point if the Board

found the General Counsel had failed its burden. But under Rule 52{c), the
Board would not be required to rule against the General Counsel at that point,
that is, at the close of the General Counsel's case. The Board would have the
discretion to wait until the close of all the evidence, that is, until after the
employer had presented its evidence in defense, to decide whether the General
Counsel had proven its initial burden. It follows logically that Rule 52(c) would
also allow the Board to consider the additional evidence presented by the
employer, because there is no rational reason that the Rule would permit the trier
offact to hear additional evidence that the trier offact could not consider.
Thus, under the principles of evidence and procedure, the -trier of fact can
consider evidence presented by the defendant in deciding whether the plaintiff
has proven its case. In Greco & Haines, the Board decided that it was logical
and fair to apply the same rule in unfair labor practice proceedings. In reaching
that conclusion, the Board implicitly presumed that it was appropriate to treat
ALJs and the Board as being comparable to a finder of fact at a civil trial.
In fact, such a comparison is appropriate, because the role that ALJs and the
Board play in unfair labor practice proceedings is similar to the role that triers
of fact play in a civil case. In a civil case, the viability of the plaintiffs claim
and the adequacy of the plaintiffs evidence are "screened" in pre-trial stages,
through motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. At trial, the
trier of fact decides which way to resolve remaining disputes of fact, and its
determinations are usually final. 336
Similarly, in an unfair labor practice case, the charging party's claim is
"screened" before it reaches the ALJ or the Board, when the General Counsel
decides whether to issue a complaint based on the charge. In making that

335. FED. R. Crv. P. 52{c) (emphasis added).
336. After trial, reviewing courts generally cannot overrule the determinations of
fact unless they are "clearly erroneous." See FED. R. Crv. P. 52{a) (prescribing "clearly
erroneous" standard for review of trial court's findings of fact); First Options of Chi.,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 (1995).
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decision, the General COWlSel is required to consider the same issues as a court
in a civil case would in ruling on motions for dismissal or summary judgment.
The Board's Casehandling Manual provides that charges should be dismissed
for "[I]egaI insufficiency of details on the face of the charge" and for "[l]ack of
sufficient evidence" supporting the charge.337 If a claim survives this screening
process and a complaint is issued, then a hearing is held before an ALJ. 338 At
this stage of the unfair labor practice proceeding, the ALJ, and then the Board,
play the decisive roles in deciding the remaining disputes of fact, much as a trier
of fact does in a civil trial. Furthermore, like the situation after a trial in a civil
case, once the Board makes its determinations of fact in an unfair labor practice
proceeding, all that remains is deferential review by an appellate court.339
In sum, in comparing unfair labor practice proceedings to civil proceedings,
it becomes clear that the functions the ALI and the Board carry out in ruling on
factual issues are closely analogous to the functions performed by the trier of fact
at a civil trial. Accordingly, it is entirely reasonable for the Board, in deciding
how to weigh evidence as the trier of fact, to follow the principles that apply to
triers of fact in civil cases. In adopting the Greco & Haines approach, the Board
has done exactly that.
Greco & Haines not only conforms with general principles of evidence, but
it is also consistent with practical considerations. The strong practical reasons
supporting the Board's approach are succinctly explained in Shattuck Denn, the
seminal Ninth Circuit decision that the Board cited in Wright Line for the
proposition that the employer's lack of a legitimate reason for its action could
help prove the General COWlSel' s case.
The portion of the Shattuck Denn decision that discussed this proposition
began with a reminder that the central issue in Section 8(a)(3) cases is "actual
motive, a state of mind."34O The court then declared that the employer's assertion
of a legitimate reason for its challenged action should not be conclusive, because
"[0]therwise no person accused of unlawful motive who took the stand and
testified to a lawful motive could be brought to book.,,341 Moreover, the court
added, the trier offact in Section 8(a)(3) was entitled to scrutinize and assess the
credibility of the employer's reason: ''Nor is the trier of fact-here the trial
examiner-required to be any more naif than is a judge.,,342 The Ninth Circuit

337. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CASEHANDLING MANUAL, pt. I, UNFAIR
LABOR PRACIlCE PROCEEDINGS ~ 10122.2(a), (e) (1989).
338. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1994); NLRB RULES AND REGULATIONS AND
STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE § 102.34 (1996).
339. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1994) (''The findings of the Board with respect to
questions offact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole

shall be conclusive.").
340. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
341. [d.

342. [d.
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next explained how the trier of fact could take the employer's reason into
account, using the words that have been echoed in so many Board decisions:
Ifhe [the trier of fact] finds that the stated motive for a discharge is
false, he can certainly infer that there is another motive. More than
that, he can infer that the motive is one that the employer desires to
conceal-an unlawful motive-at least where, as in this case, the
surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference.343
The thrust of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is that because the credibility of
the employer's reason does, as a practical matter, shed light on motive, then the
trier of fact should be permitted to consider the employer's reason in assessing
motive.344 The Board's position that the employer's evidence can be considered
at the prima facie stage is consistent with this common-sense reasoning. To hold
otherwise would be to impose an artificial blindness, or "naivete" as the Ninth
Circuit put it, on the AUs and the Board as triers offact. For example, even if
one of the employer's witnesses were to blurt out at the hearing that the
employer's asserted reasons were false and that the discriminatee had been fired
for union activity, that admission could not be considered by the trier of fact,
because the employer had "produced" that evidence. Such a result would defy
logic and common sense.34S And even in cases that are less blatant, the Board

343. ld.; see also supra text accompanying notes 131-42 (discussing Board
decisions relying on this passage in Shattuck Denn).
344. This practical insight reveals another flaw in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning,
in Medeco and CWl, that just as evidence that the employer's asserted reason is false can
support the prima facie case, evidence that the employer's reason could be true can
negate the prima facie case. See Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. NLRB, 142 F.3d 733, 742
(4th Cir. 1998); NLRB v. CWI of Maryland, 127 F.3d 319,332 (4th Cir. 1997). In fact,
these two types of evidence are not equal in probative value. When the evidence shows
that the employer's proffered reason for its action is false, that reveals that the employer
has concealed its true reason, which, as the Ninth Circuit concluded in Shattuck Denn,
strongly indicates that the true reason was improper. See Shattuck Denn, 362 F.2d at
470. On the other hand, if there is evidence that the proffered reason for an action is true,
that does not negate the possibility that the employer's antiunion animus also contributed
to that action. It just shows that there was a reason in addition to antiunion animus.
Whether that legitimate reason predominated over the antiunion motivation is a question
that should be addressed in the second stage of the Wright Line process, not at the first
stage.
345. The same reasoning compels rejection of the Second Circuit's position in
Holo-Krome III that the Board should consider evidence produced by the employer only
when it has been "elicited" by the General Counsel. See Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB
(Holo-Krome 111), 954 F.2d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 1992); supra text accompanying notes 16682 (discussing Holo-Krome III). This assertion of the Second Circuit was based on the
erroneous premise that "the General Counsel's 'prima facie case' cannot consist of
evidence that the General Counsel has failed to elicit." Holo-Krome III, 954 F.2d at 113.
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and ALJs, as triers offact, should be pennitted to apply the practical insight that
a person asserting a false reason is usually doing so to conceal another,
"improper" reason.
In sum, the Board was correct in Greco & Haines in holding that the entire
record, including the employer's defense, can be considered in assessing the
General Counsel's prima facie case.

B. Should Evidence ofPretext Playa Major Role in
Supporting the Prima Facie Case?
Greco & Haines resolved only a threshold issue. It left open the question
of the extent to which evidence of pretext can be relied on to find that the
General Counsel has met its prima facie case. It is one thing to say that evidence
of pretext can be one of numerous factors considered in deciding whether union
activity was a motivating factor in a challenged action. It is quite another to say
that evidence of pretext can be the primary basis for reaching that conclusion.
Before assessing the validity of the Board's reliance on evidence of pretext,
it is important to understand that the extent to which the Board bases its findings
of unlawful motivation on evidence of pretext is limited, even in those cases
where the Board relies on such evidence most heavily. Proof that the employer
gave a false reason for taking some action adverse to an employee or applicant
has never been considered a sufficient basis for finding a violation of Section
8(a)(3). If it were, the NLRA would be converted into a federal wrongful
discharge law: every time there was some basis for questioning the truthfulness
of an employer's stated reason for an action, the Board could be called upon to
decide if the employer committed an unfair labor practice. But Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act, by proscribing only discrimination due to union "membership,"
requires that there be some nexus between the employer's action and union
activity or support by the employee or applicant. In other words, for the Board
to even consider a Section 8(a)(3) claim, the "fIrst element" of the General
Counsel's case-union support by the aggrieved employee-must be present.

That premise conflicts with the general rule of evidence that any fact can be proven by
evidence offered by any party. See supra notes 332-35 and accompanying text. Based
on its faulty premise, the Second Circuit imposed an unjustified and impractical
limitation on the evidence that can be considered by the trier of fact. For example, under
the Second Circuit's recommendation, the Board could not consider an employer's
witness's "confession" that the proffered reason was false ifit were made during direct
testimony, but could apparently consider such a confession ifit were made during crossexamination by the General Counsel. Moreover, it would be doubtful whether the Board
could consider a confession made during questioning by an intervenor, such as the
Charging Party, as that evidence would not be "elicited" by the General Counsel. These
arbitrary results demonstrate that the distinction the Second Circuit seeks to draw
between evidence that is and is not "elicited" by the General Counsel is unworkable and
unwarranted.
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The second element-employer knowledge of the employee's union
support-is also present in virtually all cases where the Board finds a Section
8(a)(3) violation. Even in those cases, discussed in Part III, where the Board or
an ALI identified pretext as the leading factor establishing the General Counsel's
first stage case, the element of knowledge was also proven.346 Also present in
most of these cases is proof of the third element, timing that suggests a link
between the employee's activity and the employer's challenged action. 347
In sum, in most cases where evidence of pretext plays a major role in the
Board's finding that the General Counsel proved its first stage case, the General
Counsel has proven the first three elements of that case: employee union
support, employer knowledge of that support, and suspect timing. This means
that the role evidence of pretext usually plays is to prove the fourth and fmal
element, employer antiunion animus, or to serve as a substitute for that element.
In many Section 8(a)(3) cases, the animus element is the most elusive to
prove, because most employers are astute enough to avoid overt antiunion
conduct. Moreover, recent decisions by the federal courts of appeals are making
it even more difficult to prove the animus element. A number of circuit courts
have held that employer antiunion statements cannot be used as proof of animus
unless those statements are themselves unlawful threats.348 Moreover, even
when an employer has made an unlawful threat, or engaged in another unfair
labor practice, near the time of the alleged Section 8(a) (3) violation, that is not
necessarily sufficient to prove animus. At least that is the position recently
adopted by the D.C. Circuit, the court to which all Board decisions can be

appealed. In TIC, Inc. v. NLRB,349 the D.C. Circuit held that a showing of
animus must be based on more than a "single [unlawful] comment by a

346. See, e.g., Aloha Temp. Servs., Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 972, 973 (1995); Fluor
Daniel, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 498, 498 (1993); MuIIican Lumber Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 836,
838 (1993); Adco Elec. Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1113, 1126 (1992); Active Transp., 296
N.L.R.B. 431, 432 (1989), enforced mem., 924 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1991).
Part III also discusses a number of cases in which the Board relied on evidence of
pretext to infer that the knowledge element was met. But in those cases, evidence of
pretext was just one of many types of circumstantial evidence that the Board found
supported a finding of knowledge. See supra. text accompanying notes 111-17. So, even
in those cases, there was, in addition to evidence of pretext, considerable evidence
indicating employer knowledge.
347. See, e.g., Mullican Lumber, 310 N.L.R.B. at 836; Adco Elec., 307 N.L.R.B.
at 1126 (Eric Muncy discharged only a month after employer learned he signed a union
card); Active Transp., 296 N.L.R.B. at 432.
348. See, e.g., Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 246,252 (4th Cir. 1997);
Carry Cos. ofm., Inc. v. NLRB, 30 F.3d 922,927 (7th Cir. 1994); NLRB v. Vemco Inc.,
989 F.2d 1468, 1474 (6th Cir. 1993); Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB (Holo-Krome I), 907
F.2d 1343, 1345-47 (2d Cir. 1990); see also supra note 155 (citing law review articles
discussing the split between the Board and the courts of appeals on whether lawful
antiunion employer statements can be used as evidence of animus).
349. 126 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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supervisor," at least where the comment is one telling an applicant that the
employer does not like to hire union supporters.350
Given the difficulty of proving the animus element, particularly in light of
these courts of appeals precedents, there are likely to be many cases where the
General Counsel will tum to evidence of pretext to prove animus. So, the actual
question at issue is: should the Board allow the General Counsel to prove the
final element of the first stage case solely, or largely, through evidence of
pretext? Or, to refine the question even further, is it lawful and appropriate for
the Board to base a finding of animus on evidence of pretext, or to hold that a
finding of pretext can serve as a substitute for the animus element?
Whether it is lawful for the Board to use evidence of pretext in these ways
depends, of course, on the legal authorities to which the Board is bound. It
depends first on the statutory requirements that bind the Board. As previously
explained, Section 10(c) of the NLRA and Section 7(c) of the APA mandate that
the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the General Counsel to prove that the
employer's antiunion animus motivated the challenged action. Therefore, the
Board must ensure that in Section 8(a)(3) cases, it does not improperly place the
burden of persuasion on the employer to disprove that it was motivated by
antiunion animus in taking an adverse action against the discriminatee.
Unlike the NLRA and the APA, the Supreme Court's decisions in Hicks
and Reeves do not directly bind the Board, because these decisions involve
construction of federal discrimination laws rather than the NLRA. The Board,
however, must take Hicks and Reeves into account in addressing the pretext
issue. The Board's decisions are subject to judicial review by the federal
appellate courts, and Hicks and Reeves state the position of the highest of those
courts on the appropriate use of evidence of pretext in deciding whether
discriminatory motivation has been proven. The D.C. Circuit, and the Board
itself, have already recognized that Hicks is relevant to the Board's treatment of
evidence of pretext in Section 8(a)(3) cases.351
ill Precision Industries, the Board recognized the central holding in Hicks
that a finding of pretext cannot compel a fmding of unlawful discrimination as
a matter of law. ill fact, the Board relied on Hicks in adopting the similar rule
that a finding (by an ALJ or the Board) that the employer's proffered reasons for
the challenged action are pretextual does not legally compel the ALJ or the
Board to conclude that the employer violated Section 8(a)(3).3S2 The Board thus
has accepted that, in its capacity as the trier of law, it cannot declare that a
showing of pretext can serve as the legal equivalent of a showing of unlawful
motivation.

350. Id. at 338.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 273-81 (discussing D.C. Circuit decision
in Southwest Merchandising Corp. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1334 (1995)); supra notes 295-305
(discussion of Board's decision in Precision Industries).
352. See Pace Indus., Inc. (Precision Indus.), 320 N.L.R.B. 661, 661 (1996); see
also supra text accompanying notes 297-305 (discussion of Precision Industries).
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However, in Section 8(a) (3) cases, the Board and its ALJs act as triers of
fact when detennining the employer's motive for an adverse action against an
employee.353 In Precision Industries, the Board interpreted Hicks as holding that
the trier of fact's rejection of the employer proffered reasons is sufficient to
permit the trier of fact to find unlawful motivation.354 In Reeves, the Supreme
Court confirmed that the Board's interpretation of Hicks in Precision Industries
was correct.355 The Supreme Court in Reeves declared that evidence of pretext
was strong probative evidence of discriminatory motivation/56 and the Court

held that "a plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to
find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may pennit the trier of fact
to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.,,357 Reeves thus
provides support for the position that it is pennissible for the Board, in its
capacity as the trier of fact, to accord considerable weight to evidence of pretext
in detennining whether the employer has violated Section 8(a)(3).
The Board's freedom to rely on evidence of pretext to infer unlawful
motivation has limits. One limit has already been identified: the Board cannot
saddle the employer with the burden of disproving unlawful motivation.
Another limit is that the inference of unlawful motivation must be reasonable.
As previously discussed, when basing findings of unlawful motive on evidence
of pretext, the Board, as the trier of fact, is drawing an inforence of unlawful
motive from circumstantial evidence.358 It is an elementary rule of law that
inferences are valid only if they are reasonable.3S9 In Section 8(a)(3) cases, this
"reasonableness" requirement is reinforced by Transportation Management. In
that decision, the Court's finding that it was acceptable to shift the burden to the
employer in the second stage of the Wright Line process was based on the
premise that in the first stage, "the Board has soundly concluded that the
employer had an antiunion animus and that such feelings played a role in a
worker's discharge."36o Thus, under Transportation Management, the Board's

353. See supra text accompanying notes 307-11.
354. See Precision Indus., 320 N.L.R.B. at 661 & nA (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 u.s. 502,502 (1993».
355. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000)
(explaining the meaning of Hicks).
356. ld.
357. ld. at 2109.
358. See supra text accompanying note 311.
359. See DEVTIT, supra note 332, § 72.04 ("You are permitted to draw from facts
... such reasonable inferences as seem justified in light of your experience. Inferences
are deductions or conclusions which reason and common sense lead the jury to draw
from facts which have been established by the evidence in the case."). See a/so Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1942) (establishing rule that even inferences
enacted by legislative action must be "reasonable," and not "strained" or "arbitrary").
360. NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 n.6 (1983) (emphasis
added).
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finding that the General Counsel has proven the prima facie case must be
"soundly" based on evidence that reasonably supports that conclusion.
The Seventh Circuit, and possibly.the D.C. Circuit, have imposed a more
explicit limit on the Board's ability to rely on evidence of pretext to infer a
violation. As discussed in Part N, the Seventh Circuit in Union-Tribune held
that a finding of pretext, by itself, was not sufficient to support a conclusion that
the employer had an unlawful motivation, and the D.C. Circuit quoted that
holding approvingly in Laro Maintenance. 361 In effect, the Seventh Circuit has
held that it is never reasonable for the Board to infer unlawful motivation, and
to find the prima facie case is satisfied, based solely on evidence of pretext.
This is one possible resolution of the appropriate role of evidence of pretext
in Section 8(a) (3) cases: that such evidence can playa supporting, but never a
solo, role in establishing the prima facie case. Evidence of pretext could be used
to support a prima facie showing of unlawful motivation, but it would have to
be accompanied by other evidence tending to show such a motivation. Given
that union activity by the discriminatee and employer lmowledge of that activity
is almost always present in cases where the Board relies on evidence of pretext
to find a.violation, the "other evidence" that would have to accompany evidence
of pretext would most likely be evidence of antiunion animuS.362
This would be a defensible and straightforward resolution of the pretext
issue, but it would not be the correct one. The problem is that it unduly restricts
the logical and reasonable inferences that a factfinder can draw from evidence
of pretext. The "pretext is not sufficient" approach ignores the crucial insight of
Shattuck Denn, recently endorsed by the Supreme Court in Reeves, that when a
party raises a false motive for its actions, it is logical to infer that the party is
seeking to conceal an unlawful motive. In Shattuck Denn, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that "[i]f [the trier of fact] finds that the stated motive for a discharge
is false . . . he can infer that the motive is one that the employer desires to
conceal-an unlawful motive--at least where, as in this case, the surrounding
facts tend to reinforce that inference.,,363 Echoing this statement in Shattuck
Denn, the Supreme Court in Reeves held that "[i]n appropriate circumstances,
the trier offact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the

employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.,,364
Thus, ShattuckDenn and, more importantly, Reeves, hold that evidence of
pretext can be sufficient to support an inference of discriminatory motivation.
However, both decisions also state that evidence of pretext is not always a
sufficient basis for inferring discrimination. Shattuck Denn said that the

361. See Union-Tribune PubI'g Co. v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 1993);
Laro Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 224, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also supra text
accompanying notes 183-95, 201-09 (discussing Union-Tribune and Laro Maintenance).
362. See supra text accompanying note 75 (discussing the elements typically
required to prove a prima facie case).
363. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
364. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000).
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inference is justified when "the surrounding facts tend to reinforce it,,;365 Reeves
held that the inference was reasonable "in appropriate circumstances. ,,366 The
Supreme Court in Reeves went on to amplify this point, stating that its holding

did not mean that "such a showing by the plaintiff [of proof of the prima facie
case and evidence of pretext] will always be adequate to sustain a jury's fmding
ofliability.,,367 The Court offered some guidance on when evidence of pretext
would not be sufficient to permit a finding of discrimination, giving examples
of situations where "no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was
discriminatory,,,368 and explaining that whether evidence of pretext in a particular
case supports a reasonable inference of discrimination "will depend on a number
of factors. ,,369
Shattuck Denn and Reeves point toward the conclusion that the Seventh
Circuit and other courts have been wrong in holding that evidence of pretext is
never sufficient to support an inference of discrimination, and that the correct
answer is that evidence of pretext is sometimes enough to fmd discrimination.
That, of course, raises the question: When is evidence of pretext a sufficient
basis for finding discrimination under Section 8(a)(3)? More specifically, what
are the "appropriate circumstances,,370 in which the Board should be allowed to
reasonably infer an unlawful motivation based solely, or largely, on evidence of
pretext?
The key to answering this question is recognition that the phrase "evidence
of pretext" is a blanket term that actually covers different types of evidence with
varying probative values. A useful reference point in distinguishing among the
different types of evidence of pretext is the three categories of pretext discussed
in Part I.371 To recapitulate, those categories are:

365. Shattuck Denn, 362 F.2d at 470.
366. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2108.
367. ld. at 2109.
368. ld. (The examples the Court gave were (1) when "the record conclusively
revealed" that even though the reason proffered by the employer was false, there was
another non-discriminatory reason for the employer's action; and (2) when "the plaintiff
created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and

there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had
occurred.").
369. ld. (The Court said that the relevant factors included "the strength of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's
explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that
properly may be considered on [an employer's] motion for judgment as a matter of
law.").
370. ld. at2108.
371. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the categories identified
by Professor Kathleen M. Kelly).
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(1) The record makes clear that the facts underlying the employer's
proffered reason(s) for its challenged action did not exist,
(2) There is no support in the record that the facts underlying the
employer's proffered reason(s) did exist, or .
(3) The record shows that the facts underlying the proffered reason(s) did
exist, but the record shows that these facts were probably not the real
reason for the challenged action. 372
As will be discussed below, these three categories can be further divided into
more specific types of evidence of pretext.
The Board and the courts have recognized, at least implicitly, that the
evidence of pretext that provides the weakest support for an inference of
discrimination is evidence in the second category: lack of evidence in the record
to support the employer's reasons for its action. In these cases, there is no
affirmative evidence in the record that the employer's reason is false, but there
is also little or no credible evidence in the record to show that the employer's
reason is true.
When the record lacks support for the employer's proffered reason, it is
almost always because the employer has failed to present credible evidence for
that reason. 373 A common situation in which this occurs is when the ALJ
discredits, on demeanor grounds, the testimony of the employer's witnesses on
the employer's reasons for its action. If the ALJ's discrediting of the employer's
witnesses on demeanor grounds is the sole type of evidence of pretext in the
case, then a general principle of evidence law dictates that this evidence of
pretext is not sufficient to support a finding of discrimination.
The principle is that a party cannot prove a proposition solely by convincing
the trier of fact to disbelieve the witnesses of its adversary. The Supreme Court
applied this principle in 1984 in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,374 holding,
"When the testimony of a witness is not believed, the trier of fact may simply
disregard it. Normally the discredited testimony is not considered a sufficient
basis for drawing a contrary conclusion.,ms Many federal courts of appeals have
held that an issue may not be submitted to a trier offact if the only evidence to

372. See Kelly, supra note 11, at 882-84.
373. In Section 8(a)(3) cases, under the Wright Line standard, the General Counsel
presents evidence that tends to show that the employer had an antiunion motivation for
the challenged decision. It is up to the employer to present evidence that it had a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision. See supra Part II (discussing the
evidence presented. by the General Counsel and by the employer in Section 8(a)(3)
cases).
374. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
375. ld. at 512.; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57
(1986) (relying on this ruling in Bose to hold that the fact that a jury might disbelieve a
defendant's testimony about his or her state of mind is not a sufficient basis for denying

a defendant's motion for summary judgment).
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support it is the possibility that the trier of fact will disbelieve witnesses who
testify to the contrary.376
Most importantly for our purposes, the Board has also accepted this
principle. In Associated Musicians o/Greater New York,377 the Board noted that
the ALJ, based on his observation of a witness's demeanor, had disbelieved the
witness's testimony denying that he had been threatened. The Board then
explained that the ALJ's disbelief of that denial "does not, of course, convert a
denial into affirmative evidence" that the threat had occurred.378 In Lockwoven
CO./ 79 the Board affirmed an ALJ decision that expressly rejected the General
Counsel's argument that disbelieving the employer's witnesses' testimony
warranted the inference that the opposite of their testimony was true.380 The ALJ
acknowledged that he disbelieved the testimony of these witnesses, who he
stated were "inconsistent" and "evasive," and had "claimed lack ofmemory.,,381
But the ALJ then explained that "any inference that the opposite occurred" could
not come solely from disbelief of the witnesses' testimony, but "must be drawn
from all the surrounding circumstances. ,,382 Based on all these precedents, it is
clear that in a Section 8(a)(3) case, the Board could not base a findirig that the
General Counsel proved its prima facie case solely on the fact that the ALJ
discredited on demeanor grounds the testimony of the employer's witnesses on
the employer's reasons for the challenged action.
When the Seventh Circuit held in Union-Tribune that evidence of pretext
was insufficient by itself to support a finding of discrimination, the type of
evidence of pretext the court apparently had in mind was disbelief of the
employer's testimony on demeanor grounds.383 The only authority the Seventh
Circuit cited for the proposition that evidence of pretext is insufficient was the
court's prior decision in Roper Corp. v. NLRB.384 In Roper, the ALJ and Board
had found that the General Counsel had proven an element of an unfair labor
practice claim-that the employer never notified the union of its intention to
change a tenn of employment--even though the General Counsel presented no

376. See, e.g., United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1977)
(emphasis added) ("a jury is free, on the basis ofa witness' demeanor, to 'assume the
truth of what he denies,' although a court cannot allow a civil action, much less a
criminal prosecution, to go to the jury on the basis ofthis alone."); Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1965) (reasoning that "[w]ere the rule otherwise a case
could be made for any proposition in the world by the simple process of calling one's
adversary and arguing to the jury that he was not to be believed.").
377. 212 N.L.R.B. 645 (1974).
378. ld. at 646.
379. 245 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1979)
380. ld. at 1370.
381. ld.
382. ld.
383. See Union-Tribune Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 1993).
384. See id. (citing Roper Corp. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1983».
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evidence on that element.38S The ALJ found, and the Board affinned, that the
element had been proven because the ALJ disbelieved the employer witnesses,
whose demeanor the ALJ regarded as "less than candid and forthright," when
they testified that the employer notified the union. 386 In Roper, the Seventh
Circuit struck down the ruling that the General Counsel had proven this element,
holding that a party in an NLRB proceeding cannot meet its burden of
persuasion solely by convincing the ALJ to disbelieve the testimony presented
by the other side.387
In light of its reliance on Roper, the Seventh Circuit in Union-Tribune was
apparently concerned about a narrow class of cases, those where the finding of
unlawful motive is based solely on disbelief of the employer's witnesses based
on their demeanor, and yet the court applied its ruling to all cases involving a
"finding of pretext." Union-Tribune thus illustrates a typical, and problematic,
approach to pretext cases. As set forth above,388 there are at least three distinct
categories of evidence of pretext, with multiple forms of evidence within each
category. Nonetheless, the Board and the courts tend to lump all types of
evidence together under the unitary label of pretext. As can be seen in the
discussions of Board and court cases in Parts III and N, the Board and courts
consistently use the terms "pretext" or "evidence of pretext" to refer to any type
of evidence (or lack of evidence) that indicates that the employer's asserted
reasons for its action may not be true.
This approach ignores the fact that not all evidence of pretext is equal.
Whether it is legitimate for the Board to infer unlawful motivation based on
evidence of pretext depends largely on what type of evidence of pretext it is. As
explained above,389 the Board has already recognized that it cannot base a
finding of discrimination on the fact that the employer's testimony of its reasons
has been discredited on demeanor grounds. This is just the clearest example of
why it is inappropriate to base a finding of discrimination on "second category"
evidence of pretext, the category referring to cases where the employer has failed
to present credible evidence supporting its proffered reasons for its action.
Basing a finding of discrimination on the employer's failure of proof effectively
amounts to requiring the employer to prove that it had a legitimate reason for the
challenged action. Placing this burden on the employer is, of course, forbidden
by Section lO(c) of the NLRA and Section 7(c) of the APA, and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of those provisions in Transportation Management and
Greenwich Collieries.

385.
386.
387.
388.

See Roper Corp., 263 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1074 (1982).
ld.
Roper, 712 F.2d at 310.
See supra text accompanying note 11 (identifying categories of evidence of

pretext).
389. See supra text accompanying notes 377-78 (discussing Associated Musicians
o/Greater New York).
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On the other hand, employers have gone too far in arguing, in cases like

Union-Tribune, Holo-Krome II, Holo-Krome III, and Precision Industries, that
the Board's reliance on any evidence of pretext in assessing the General
Counsel's case places an impermissible burden on employers. The crucial
distinction is between "second category" evidence that fails to prove the
employer's reason, and evidence in the first and third categories, evidence that
provides affirmative proof that the employer's asserted reason is not merely
unproven but deliberately false.
First category evidence of pretext is evidence that makes it clear that the
facts underlying the employer proffered reasons for its action did not exist. The
most blatant form of such evidence would be affirmative proof that the employer
fabricated the asserted reasons for its action. That sort of defInitive, "smoking
gun" evidence is quite rare. However, other forms of "first category" evidence,
evidence that provides strong proof that the reasons offered by the employer
were non-existent, are commonly relied on by the Board.
One particularly egregious example is Active Transportation, in which the
employer claimed that the decision to discharge four union supporters was made
based on a review of their personnel fIles. 390 This explanation was completely
undermined by the fIles themselves, as none of them contained anything
remotely negative about any of the discharged employees.391 In another
discharge case, Asociacion Hospital del Maestro, Inc.,m the employer asserted
that a union activist was fIred for taking "unauthorized liberties," when in fact
the employee had been given permission by his supervisors before engaging in
the activities at issue.393 Similarly, in Cincinnati Truck Center, the employer's
proffered reason for fIring a union supporter was that the employee failed or
refused to follow a supervisor's instructions, while the record showed that on the
day the employee was alleged to be disobedient, the employee had at all times
acted in accordance with the directions of his supervisor.394

The "first category" type of evidence of pretext has also been present in
refusal to hire cases. For example, in Aloha Temporary Services, Inc.,395 the
employer maintained that its reason for rejecting four union adherents was that
another employee had applied before they did, but the record showed that in fact
this employee had applied after the discriminatees.396 Such evidence of pretext
was also relied on in Laro Maintenance, the important D.C. Circuit decision that

390. See Active Transp., 296 N.L.R.B. 431, 431-32 (1989), enforced mem., 924
F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1991).
391. ld.
392. 291 N.L.R.B. 198,204 (1988).

393. ld.
394. See Transmart, Inc. (Cincinnati Truck Ctr.), 315 N.L.R.B. 554, 556-57 (1994),
enforcedmem., 117F.3d 1421 (6thCir.1997).
395. 318 N.L.R.B. 972 (1995).
396. ld. at 974.
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affirmed the Board's approach to pretext.397 As discussed previously, in Laro
Maintenance, a cleaning contractor claimed it rejected the employees of the
predecessor contractor because it desired "better quality" employees, while the
record showed that the employer never actually investigated the quality of the
predecessor's employees and the employer instead hired employees with poor
work records and with no relevant experience.398 .
In all of these cases involving "first category" evidence of pretext, there was
affinnative evidence that showed, or at least strongly indicated, that the reasons
the employer asserted for the challenged action were false. In these cases, the
Board drew the logical inference, explicated by the Ninth Circuit in Shattuck
Denn and recently approved by the Supreme Court in Reeves, that the employer
proffered a false reason in order to conceal an unlawful motive.
Both Shattuck Denn and Reeves state that this inference of unlawful motive
may be drawn when the "surrounding facts" or "circumstances" make the
inference "appropriate.,,399 This test is met by a Section 8(a)(3) case involving
"fIrst category" evidence of pretext. First, as discussed above, in virtually all
Section 8 (a) (3) cases, it is proven that the discriminatee is a known union
supporter, which establishes that it is at least possible that the employer had an
antiunion motive for its action against the employee. More importantly, "first
category" evidence of pretext does not consist merely of disbelief of the
employer's evidence for its reasons, but is affirmative evidence that shows or
strongly indicates that the employer's reason is false. SignifIcantly, in Reeves,
the Supreme Court held that any evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact
to disbelieve the employer's explanation,40o which would include forms of

evidence less probative than "first category" evidence ofpretext,401 could support

397. See Laro Maint. Corp., 56 F.3d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1995); supra text
accompanying notes 201-09 (discussing Laro Maintenance).
398. See supra text accompanying notes 201-05.
399. See Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466,470 (9th Cir. 1966)
(trier offact can infer unlawful motive from false reason "where ... the surrounding facts
tend to reinforce that inference"); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.
Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000) (stating that "[i]n appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can
reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is ... cover[ing]
up a discriminatory purpose").
400. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2103,2109 (referring to "sufficient evidence for the
trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's ... explanation" and "sufficient evidence to
reject the defendants's explanation").
401. The meaning of "sufficient evidence" for the trier of fact to disbelieve the
employer is not specifically defined in Reeves. Given the Supreme Court's holding in
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485,512 (1984), the evidence must consist
of more than the trier of fact's discrediting of the testimony of the employer's witnesses.
See supra text accompanying notes 374-75. Nonetheless, there are many forms of
evidence that can support a trier of fact's disbelief of a party that are less direct and less
obviously probative than the strong, "first category" evidence of pretext that the Board
has relied on in many cases. See supra notes 390-98 and accompanying text (discussing
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the inference of unlawful motivation. It follows that first category evidence of
pretext should generally be sufficient to support the inference of unlawful
motivation.
This conclusion that first category evidence of pretext is sufficient to infer
unlawful motivation is further supported by the Supreme Court's discussion in
Reeves of the probative worth of findings of pretext. In discussing pretext, the
Court emphasized the value of affirmative proof that the employer's reason is
false, which is the underlying definition of "first category" evidence of pretext.
"Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence," the Court
stated in Reeves, "is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite
persuasive.'>402 The Court also relied on "the general principle of evidence law
that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material
fact as 'affirmative evidence of guilt. ",403 Under this principle, the trier of fact
should certainly be entitled to infer guilt based on first category evidence of
pretext that affirmatively demonstrates the employer's "dishonesty" about the
centrally "material" fact of its reason for the challenged action.
Thus, in Section 8(a)(3) cases in which there is first category, affirmative
proof that the employer's reason is false, it is certainly "appropriate" under
Shattuck Denn and Reeves for the Board as trier of fact to infer unlawful
motivation. In sum, where the discriminatee is a union activist or supporter, and
the evidence shows that the employer has misrepresented and hidden its true
reason for its action against the employee, it is certainly reasonable for the trier
of fact to infer that the hidden motive is retaliation for the discriminatee' s union
activity.
It is possible that the motive the employer is hiding is something other than
antiunion animus. The employer may be concealing a motive not because it
violates the NLRA, but because it is embarrassing, immoral, or violative of some
other statute.404 This possibility was the basis for the Board's holding in
Precision Industries 40s that evidence of pretext cannot compel a finding of a
Section 8(a)(3) violation as a matter oflaw.406 However, the possibility that an
employer could be concealing a motive other than antiunion animus does not
change the fact that when the employee is a known union supporter, and
evidence shows that all the reasons the employer has given for acting against the

examples of cases where the Board relied on "first category" evidence of pretext to infer
unlawful motivation).
402. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2108.
403. [d. (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992».
404. See, e.g., Mid-State, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 185 (2000); Hoboken Shipyards,
275 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1985); Perko's Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 884, 899 n.41 (1978) (cases
involving employees who pursued the altemative theories that the employer took adverse
actions against them because of antiunion animus or because of iIIegal status (race, sex,
age) discrimination).
405. See Pace Indus., Inc. (Precision Indus.), 320 N.L.R.B. 661 (1996).
406. [d. at 661.
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employee are false, it is reasonable for the Board to conclude that the employee's
union support was the most likely reason for the employer's action.
Such a conclusion is not only reasonable, it is also eminently fair to the
employer. As the Supreme Court recently recognized in Reeves, "the employer
is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision."407 If the
employer chooses to lie about that actual reason, a reasonable employer must
lmow that it bears the risk that its lie will be exposed. Moreover, if at an unfair
labor practice hearing, the employer (or its lawyer) sees that evidence is entering
the record that shows that the employer's proffered reason is false, the employer
can still avoid Section 8(a)(3) liability by revealing its "true motive," if that

motive is anything besides antiunion animUS. 408 If an employer relinquishes the
opportunity to reveal its true motive, then it would be audacious indeed for that
employer to insist that the trier of fact cannot draw the logical inference that false
reasons conceal an illegal motive because the trier of fact should first consider
all the other improper motives the employer may have desired to conceal.
Thus, it is logical, and it is not unfair to the employer, to permit the Board
to uphold the General Counsel's prima facie case based on affirmative evidence
that the employer has lied about its reasons for an adverse action against a
lmown union supporter. In addition, it is important as a policy matter for the
Board to be permitted to uphold the prima facie case in those circumstances. As
discussed above, the alternative is that an employer could never be held in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) unless the General Counsel proved the "animus"
element of the Wright Line standard.409 That would open an avenue for
antiunion employers to fire and discipline union activists and supporters with
impunity. It would mean that no matter how blatantly fabricated an employer's
reasons for acting against union supporters were, their falsity would never be
enough to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. It would leave antiunion
employers free to trump-up blatantly false charges against union supporters, as
long as the employer avoided expressing antiunion animus or providing "other
407. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2109 (2000).
408. The only motives proscribed by Section 8(a)(3) are those relating to union
activity or support. See supra note 1 (summarizing Section 8(a)(3». In some cases, the
employer's reluctance to disclose its true motive may stem from the fact that its tru~
motive is illegal under some other statute (e.g., an employment discrimination statute)
and it fears its admission in the NLRB case would be used as evidence in an employment
discrimination suit. That is no basis for protecting the employer from the logical
inferences drawn from its deception. First, an employer that has lied about its motives
for its action against an employee in order to cover up an illegal motive for that action
is in no position to complain; the employer is reaping what it has sewn. Moreover,
giving deference to the possibility that the employer's lies are to conceal another
unlawful motive opens the opportunity for employers to escape liability regardless of
their motives, because they could always argue that they cannot be held liable under one
statute (e.g., the NLRA) because they could have had a motivation that's illegal under
a different statute (e.g., an employment discrimination statute).
409. See supra notes 348-50 and accompanying text.
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evidence" of discrimination. Accordingly, the Board must retain the freedom,
as a fact-finder, to infer unlawful motivation based solely on evidence of pretext
in appropriate cases.
As explained above,4lo cases involving first category evidence of pretext are
certainly "appropriate cases" for inferring unlawful motivation. However, most
cases where the Board relies on evidence of pretext to find a Section 8(a) (3)
violation involve evidence that fits in the third category, where the record shows
that though the facts underlying the proffered reason did exist, it is unlikely that
these facts were the real reason for the challenged action. Like first category
evidence of pretext, most forms of "third category" evidence strongly imply
deception and concealment by the employer, and therefore are valid bases for the
Board to find unlawful motivation.

The probative value of "third category" type of evidence of pretext was
implicitly endorsed in the two cases that established the Wright Line standard,
the Supreme Court's decision in Transportation Management and the Board's
decision in Wright Line itself. As discussed in Part II, evidence of pretext was
relied on in both of these cases to find a Section 8(a)(3) violation. 41l In
Transportation Management, the discriminatee, Mr. Santillo, had in fact left the
ignition keys in his bus and taken unauthorized breaks, the reasons the employer
gave for firing him. The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Board that
the record demonstrated that these were not the true reasons for the discharge,
based on such evidence as the fact that the employer had never before
disciplined any employee for these "commonplace" events, and the fact that the
employer had departed from its usual practice of issuing warnings before
disciplining employees.412 The Supreme Court concluded that this type of
"evidence of pretext" was "substantial evidence" in support of the Board's
conclusion that the employer violated Section 8(a)(3).413
Similarly, in Wright Line, the discriminatee was discharged for "falsifying
time reports," and the employee conceded that he had not performed certain
tasks at the times indicated on his timesheet.414 The Board found, however, that
the asserted reason for the discharge was "suspect," because "the record
show[ed] that employees commonly completed timesheets as [the discriminatee]
had" without being penalized, and the employer had departed from its practice
of warning employees before disciplining them for such violations.41S As in
Transportation Management, even though the facts underlying the employer's
reasons did exist, the evidence that they were probably not the true reasons for
410. See supra notes 390-98 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 43-47 (discussing evidence of pretext in Wright Line); supra
notes 68-71 (discussing evidence of pretext in Transportation Management).
412. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 (1983).
413. ld. at 405.
414. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1090 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899

(Ist Cir. 1981).
415. ld.
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the challenged action supported the finding that the employer's actual motivation
was unlawfu1.416 Thus, from the very inception of the Wright Line standard,
"third category" type evidence of pretext has been relied on to infer an unlawful
motivation.
More specifically, in both Transportation Management and Wright Line,
the factors that made the employer's proffered reason suspect were that the

discriminatee was treated more harshly than employees who had engaged in
similar conduct, and that the employer had departed from its past practice in
disciplining the employee. Both of these factors, particularly differential
treatment, are commonly relied on by the Board to find that the employer has
sought to conceal the true reason for its action. A typical example of reliance on
differential treatment is ABF Freight System, Inc.,417 in which Michael Manso,
a union supporter, was discharged for tardiness, while other workers were treated
much less strictly when they were tardy.418
The typical example of "departure from past practice" is where an
employer precipitously discharges or suspends an employee instead of following
its written rules or usual practice of first resorting to warnings or supervisory
counseling for an employee.419 Departure from past practice also arises in nondiscipline cases, such as Section 8 (a) (3) cases involving layoffs or refusals to
hire. For example, in Property Resources COrp.,420 the employer claimed it had

416. ld. at 1090-91.
417. 304 N.L.R.B. 585 (1991), enforced sub nom. Miera v. NLRB, 982 F.2d441
(IOth Cir. 1992).
418. ld. at 590. ABF Freight appealed the Tenth Circuit's decision to the Supreme
Court, arguing that the fact that Mr. Manso had lied at the unfair labor practice hearing
about the reason for his tardiness should preclude him from obtaining any remedy for his
unlawful discharge. The Court rejected the employer's argument, and held that when a
discriminatee lies under oath at an unfair labor practice hearing, the Board is not
necessarily required to deny that discriminatee a remedy. See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v.
NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994).
As discussed previously, "differential treatment" of the discriminatee was also the
major basis for the Board's and Seventh Circuit's finding of pretext in Union-Tribune.
See supra notes 183-95 and accompanying text; see also Transmart, Inc. (Cincinnati
Truck Ctr.), 315 N.L.R.B. 554, 555, 556 (1994), enforced, 117 F.3d 1421 (6th Cir. 1997)
(union supporter was only employee disciplined for "clocking in on an open ticket,"
though other employees had engaged in this practice).
419. See, e.g., Pitt Ohio Express, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 867, 870 (1997) (employer
"never counseled or warned [discriminatees] about such alleged misconduct though
affording counseling to other employees for infractions of company rules or policies");

Van Dyne Crotty Co., 297 N.L.R.B. 899, 899, 902 (1990) (employer departed "from its
own written rules in discharging [discriminatee] without warning"); Asociacion Hosp.
del Maestro, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 198,204 (1988) (discriminatee, "a longtime employee,
was suspended for 30 days although, unlike other employees, he had never received a
prior written warning").
420. 285 N.L.R.B. 1105 (1987), enforced, 863 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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laid off unionized painters because of delays in receiving federal subsidies for
repair and maintenance. But even at the hearing the chairman of the employer's
board testified that the employer's usual practice was to make repair and
maintenance work its top priority and to keep its personnel engaged in such work
even when federal funds were not available. 421
Besides differential treatment and departure from past practice, there are
other kinds of "third category" evidence on which the Board relies to fmd
pretext. Among the most common is the fact that the employer has provided
"shifting" or "inconsistent" reasons for taking the challenged action. "Shifting"
reasons refers to situations where the reason the employer asserts for its action
changes over time, the change most commonly occurring between the time of the
action and either the time of the Board's investigation of the matter, or the time
of the unfair labor practice hearing.422 "Inconsistent" reasons refers to cases
where the employer's own officials provide contradictory testimony as to the
reasons that motivated the challenged action.423 In many cases where the Board
has relied on the employer's provision of shifting or inconsistent reasons to fmd
a Section 8(a)(3) violation, the Board has invoked the logical principle that "[an
employer's] inability to settle upon an explanation for its conduct warrants
drawing an unfavorable inference against [the employer]-in short, that its
asserted reason for [its action against the discriminatee] is pretextual and an
afterthought, and that the real reason is a discriminatory reason. ,,424
A fmal significant "third category" type of evidence of pretext, which is
often relied on in discipline cases, is the fact that the employer failed to
investigate the allegations underlying the discipline. A typical example is the
Board's 1999 decision in Bonham Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.,425 in which
the employer's owner claimed his reason for personally tenninating a key union
supporter was that the employee had "harassed" a co-worker during an argument
over a recent union election. As a basis for finding this reason to be pretextual,

421. ld. at 1110-11.
422. See, e.g., Ellis (Ellis Elec.), 315 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1195-97, 1202, 1204-05
(1994) (shifting reasons given for layoffs and for termination of employee Melissa
Jacobs); Adco Elec., Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1113,1128-29 (1992), enforced, 6 F.3d 1110
(5th Cir. 1993) (shifting reasons for discharge of employee Muncy); Seminole Fire Prot.,
Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 590, 592 (1992) (over time, employer provided "three different
versions" for why it discharged employee Bennett).
423. See, e.g., Excel Container, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 17,29 (1997) (inconsistencies
between testimony of employer officials Fortune and Cessna as to when and why the
employer discharged employee Medina); Hi-Tech Cable Corp., 318 N .L.R.B. 280, 292
(1995), enforced in relevant part, 128 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1997) (inconsistent testimony
of employer agents Brown and French on why the employer rejected applicant Jones).
424. Sentry Investigation Corp., 249 N.L.R.B. 926, 928 (I 980). See also Laidlaw
Transit, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 509, 512 (1994); Park Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 277
N.L.R.B. 197,205 n.14 (1985) (examples of cases invoking this same principle).
425. 328 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1999).
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the ALJ relied on the facts that "Bonham made no actual investigation of the
circumstances of the argument he heard about but did not observe, and he
immediately seized upon the opportunity to accuse [the discriminatee] of being
the instigator without giving [the discriminatee] an opportunity to defend
himself.'>426 Similarly, in Pitt Ohio Express, Inc.,427 the ALJ reasoned that "[t]he
fact that [the employees'] version of events is not sought before the discharges
is a basis to infer the Respondent seized on its own concoction as a pretext for
discharging them."428 As exemplified by these two cases, the Board regards
evidence that the employer failed to investigate or confirm an allegation as a
strong indication that the employer "seized upon" that allegation as an excuse to
rid itself of a union supporter.
Indeed, a finding that the employer has "seized upon" some action or event
to justify the challenged action is a common theme in cases where the Board
relies on any of the above-described types of "third category" evidence of
pretext.429 In the third category, there are true facts underlying the employer's
asserted reason for its action. The record shows that the employee did commit
the act or omission that the employer proffers as the basis for discipline, or that
the event or circumstance that the employer claims caused the layoff or refusal
to hire did in fact occur. But the record also shows that the discriminatee, a
known union supporter, was disciplined more harshly for the act or omission
than co-workers ever have been before; or that the employer immediately fired
a known union supporter rather than following its rule or usual practice of
issuing a warning for a first offense; or that the employer fired a known union
supporter without bothering to investigate the basis for the firing. In cases
involving shifting or inconsistent reasons, the record shows that there are "true
facts" underlying the reasons the employer proffers for a decision, but the
employer is unable to consistently explain which of these true facts actually
motivated its decision.
In these circumstances, logic and common sense dictate that it is unlikely
that the underlying facts, though true, actually motivated the employer's action.
It is far more likely that the employer "seized upon" these facts as an excuse to
justify its action, and that is exactly the conclusion the Board reaches in most
cases involving "third category" evidence of pretext. The Board logically
concludes that when an employer seizes upon an excuse for its action, the
employer is obviously concealing the true reason for that action. Thus, although
"third category" evidence is less direct than "first category" evidence that the

426. ld. at *17.
427. 322 N.L.R.B. 867 (1997).
428. ld. at 870.
429. See, e.g., Frazier Indus. Co., 328 N.L.R.B. No. 89, at *4-5 (1999); Dravo
Lime Co., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 118, at *6 (1998); Dunham's Athleisure Corp., 318
N.L.R.B. 622, 623 (1995), enforced mem., 100 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 1996); ABF Freight
Sys., Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 585, 591 (1991), enforced sub nom. Miera v. NLRB, 982 F.2d
441 (10th Cir. 1992); Williams Servs., Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 492,502 (1991).
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employer's proffered reason did not exist at all, "third category" evidence is also
strong evidence of deception and concealment by the employer.
In sum, in cases involving "first category" or "third category" evidence of
pretext, the evidence either directly demonstrates, or strongly indicates,
employer deception and concealment. As noted previously, almost all Section
8(a)(3) cases involve action taken against a known union supporter. Therefore,
in cases where there is "first category" or "third category" evidence of pretext,
the Board is reviewing a record that shows that the employer has taken some

adverse action against a known union activist or supporter and that the employer
is concealing its motivation for taking that action. It follows logically that the
motivation being concealed is the employee's union activity or support, and it
is manifestly reasonable for the Board to make this inference. Therefore, it is
rational, and consistent with requirements of the NLRA and the APA, for the
Board to base an inference of unlawful motivation largely, or even solely, on
such evidence of pretext.
On the other hand, in cases where "evidence of pretext" means only
disbelief of the employer's reason, based on the demeanor of the employer's
witnesses or other deficiencies in the employer's evidence in support of that
reason, then the Board cannot rest its finding of unlawful motivation on such
evidence, as that would amount to requiring the employer to prove a legitimate
reason for its action. As discussed in Part VI, this distinction between different
types of evidence of pretext means it is imperative that the Board clearly explain
in "pretext" cases the reasoning underlying its fmdings of unlawful motivation.

VI. CONCLUSION
To answer the question posited in this Article's title, the Board has not gone
wrong in its approach to pretext cases. The Board was correct in Greco &
Haines in holding that it can consider evidence of pretext in assessing whether
the General Counsel has proven its prima facie case. In addition, contrary to the
position of the Seventh Circuit in Union-Tribune, and to the D.C. Circuit's
apparent agreement with that position in Laro Maintenance, the Board is also
correct in cases where it relies solely on evidence of pretext to infer that an
employer's action against a known union supporter was unlawfully motivated,
where that evidence of pretext consists of evidence that shows, or strongly
implies, that the employer has misrepresented or concealed its reason for the
challenged action.
This does not mean, however, that the Board need only "stay the course"
in its approach to pretext cases. First, the Board should follow the advice of the
D.C., Second, and Fourth Circuits and discontinue using the term "prima facie
case" to refer to the General Counsel's burden under the Wright Line standard.
Although the Board was correct in Manno Electric in referring to this as merely
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an issue of "phraseology,"430 the Board should also recognize that it is desirable
to avoid misleading "phraseology" in its decisions and standards, and that the
use of the phrase "prima facie case" in describing the Wright Line standard is
misleading in at least two respects.
First, as the Second Circuit discussed in Holo-Krome III and the D.C.
Circuit discussed in Southwest Merchandising, the phrase "prima facie case"
implies that the General Counsel need only make some preliminary showing of
grounds for suspecting unlawful motivation by the employer, when in fact the
Board consistently requires the General Counsel to sustain the burden of actually
proving such unlawful motivation.431
Second, the term "prima facie case" is ordinarily used to refer to "the
evidence necessary to require defendant to proceed with his case.,,432 In Section
8(a)(3) cases, however, under the approach the Board established in Greco &
Haines, the employer is not entitled to obtain a ruling on the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the General Counsel's "prima facie case" before the
employer proceeds with its defense. As previously discussed,433 the Board has
justifiably ruled that the only way employers can require ALJs to evaluate the
General Counsel's "prima facie case" based solely on the evidence presented by
the General Counsel is if the employer desists from presenting any evidence in
its own defense.
For these reasons, the tenn "prima facie case" is an inaccurate means of
referring to the burden placed on the General Counsel under the Wright Line
standard. The Board should simply refer to the General Counsel's burden as the
"first stage burden," just as it typically refers to the employer's burden as the
"second stage burden."
More important than discontinuing the use of the phrase "prima facie case,"
the Board must make a deliberate effort to explain more fully and clearly its
bases for relying on evidence of pretext to find unlawful motivation. Otherwise,
if the Board simply continues its present approach, it runs a serious risk of being
found to have "gone wrong" in its approach to pretext cases. That is because in
most pretext cases, the Board and its ALJs fail to fully explain the process of
reasoning through which they use the evidence of pretext to infer an unlawful
motivation by the employer. This makes it easy for employers to attack, and
some courts of appeals to misunderstand, the Board's reliance on evidence of
pretext.
In Section 8 (a) (3) cases, the Board should explain that it is acting as the
trier of fact in determining the employer's motive for the action at issue. The

430. See supra text accompanying notes 288-90.
431. See supra note 171 and accompanying text; supra notes 283-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's and D.C. Circuit's criticism of the
phrase "prima facie case").
432. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (6th ed. 1990)(citing White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1974».
433. See supra text accompanying notes 315-18.
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Board should then explain that, as the trier of fact, it is entitled to consider all
evidence, including evidence presented by the employer, in making its fmdings
of fact. This explanation will make it clear that the Board is correct in holding
that it can consider the employer's evidence, including evidence of pretext, in
assessing the first stage of the Wright Line process.
In addition, when the Board relies largely on evidence of pretext to infer
unlawful motivation, it should make clear the type of evidence of pretext on
which it relies. In particular, the Board should explain that its inference of
unlawful motivation is based on evidence of pretext that shows, or strongly
indicates, that the employer has misrepresented the reason for its challenged
action. It may well be that in cases where the Board relies heavily on evidence
of pretext to infer unlawful motivation, it is implicitly determining that the
inference is justified because the evidence demonstrates employer deception and
concealment. If so, the Board still must make such reasoning more explicit. As
discussed above, the generic tenus "pretext" or "evidence of pretext" cover
many different types of evidence that cast doubt on the validity of the reasons by
the employer. Thus, when the Board simply uses these generic terms to describe
the bases for its finding of illegal motivation, it pennits employers to argue, and
some courts of appeals to conclude, that the Board's ruling is improperly based
merely on its disbelief of the testimony of the employer's witnesses and on the
employer's failure to prove a lawful motivation.
The Board should explain that in relying on evidence of pretext, it is not
relying on such relatively weak evidence of pretext, and thus the Board is not
effectively placing the burden on the employer to prove a legitimate reason for
its action. Rather, the Board should explain that it is basing its inference of
unlawful motivation on evidence of pretext that establishes, or strongly indicates,
that the employer has misrepresented it..c;. reason for the challenged action, and
thus concealed its true reason for the action. The Board should then invoke the
insight of Shattuck Denn and Reeves, and point out that evidence that the
employer has misrepresented or concealed the motive for its challenged action
against a known union supporter gives rise to the reasonable and legally
pennissible inference that the true motive for the challenged action is the
unlawful one of antiunion animus.
The basic premise that underlies the Board's approach to pretext cases is
that evidence of employer deception and concealment is strong evidence of
unlawful motivation. That premise is fundamentally sound. By more fully
explaining the reasoning behind that premise, the Board can ensure that this type
of evidence of pretext will be pennitted to play its proper role in establishing
violations of Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.

